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ABSTRACT. Subjective beliefs play a role in many economic decisions. There is a large theoretical
literature on the elicitation of beliefs, and an equally large empirical literature. However, there is a
gulf between the two. The theoretical literature proposes a range of procedures that can be used to
recover beliefs, but stresses the need to make strong auxiliary assumptions or “calibrating
adjustments” to elicited reports in order to recover the latent belief. With some notable exceptions,
the empirical literature seems intent on either making those strong assumptions or ignoring the need
for calibration. We make three contributions to bridge this gulf. First, we offer a general theoretical
framework in which the belief elicitation task can be viewed as an exchange of state-dependent
commodities between two traders.  Second, we provide a specific elicitation procedure which has clear
counterparts in field betting environments, and that is directly motivated by our theoretical
framework. Finally, we illustrate how one can jointly estimate risk attitudes and subjective beliefs using
structural maximum likelihood methods. This allows the observer to make inferences about the
latent subjective belief, calibrating for virtually any well-specified model of choice under uncertainty.
We demonstrate our procedures with an experiment in which we elicit subjective probabilities over
three future events and one fact.
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Subjective beliefs play a role in many economic decisions. In individual choice settings, any
time the agent faces a decision in the presence of risk there is a role for subjective probabilities. Or
we might be interested in knowing the forecast an individual makes of some event, since the event is
important to others. In strategic settings, virtually all solution concepts hinge on assumptions about
consistency of beliefs.
There is a large theoretical literature on the elicitation of beliefs, and an equally large
empirical literature. However, there is a gulf between the two. The theoretical literature proposes a
range of procedures that can be used to recover beliefs, but stresses the need to make auxiliary
assumptions or “calibrating adjustments” to elicited reports in order to recover the latent belief. One
such assumption is risk neutrality, but there are many others that play a role in practically important
elicitation settings as we see below. Unfortunately, none are obviously “weak” assumptions. With
some notable exceptions, the empirical literature seems intent on either making those strong
assumptions or ignoring the need for calibration.
We make three contributions to bridge this gulf. First, we offer a general theoretical framework in
which the belief elicitation task can be viewed as an exchange of state-dependent commodities
between two traders. This framework is implicit in some of the literature, but serves the important
role of unifying the analysis of several important elicitation procedures, such as the Quadratic
Scoring Rule (QSR) for individuals and “prediction markets” for groups. It also motivates our
second contribution, a specific elicitation procedure which has clear counterparts in field betting
environments. The procedure also bears a family resemblance to applications of “multiple price list”
methods that have become widely adopted in experimental economics for the elicitation of risk
attitudes, discount rates and product valuations. We also use the general theoretical framework to
point to extensions of the specific procedures we adopt, to better understand differences between
different elicitation procedures. Finally, we illustrate how one can jointly estimate risk attitudes and
1 When we use the expression “risk attitudes,” it should be understood that it is only synonymous
with properties of the curvature of the utility function if one assumes EUT. In popular alternative models it is
also affected by the possibility of probability weighting and loss aversion, and our approach allows for these
possibilities if they are present. In fact, we undertake explicit corrections for probability weighting in §3.
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subjective beliefs using structural maximum likelihood methods. This allows the observer to make
inferences about the latent subjective belief, calibrating for virtually any well-specified model of
choice under uncertainty. Thus one is not restricted to analytically tractable functional forms, or
even to Expected Utility Theory (EUT).1
In section 1 we explain the basic elicitation procedure and some variants. In section 2 we
provide a formal theoretical framework to understand the procedure, and how it connects with
other elicitation procedures that have been proposed. In section 3 we develop an experimental
design to examine the behavioral properties of the specific procedure we illustrate. We apply it to
elicit subjective beliefs in mid-2006 that Donald Rumsfeld would resign by the end of the year (he
did), Tiger Woods would win the next U.S. Open golf championship (he did not), that Brazil would
win the World Cup soccer tournament (they did not), and that Madrid was the capital of Portugal
(no, but close). In section 4 we present the results of some laboratory experiments testing the
procedure, focusing on the joint econometric estimation of subjective beliefs and a model of choice
under uncertainty.
We find that inferences about subjective beliefs are fragile, in the constructive sense that one
has to commit to some model of decision making under risk before recovering latent subjective
beliefs. The need for such corrections has been well-known for decades, but ignored in practical
applications. We believe that the time is nigh for a re-balancing of the experimental and econometric
procedures used in belief elicitation to better address the theoretical issues raised long ago. These
results also have serious implications for ongoing debates over whether open prediction markets
recover aggregate beliefs that represent anything useful.
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Several appendices provide detailed discussion on select topics. Appendix A presents a
formal mathematical statement of the general approach proposed in section 2, as well as additional
implications of that approach. Appendix B contains the complete instructions provided to
experimental subjects. Appendix C discusses extensions to our approach, building on the specific
experimental procedure we use and the insights from the general theoretical framework. We view
these extensions as mapping out a research program that can also build a bridge between the
elicitation of individual beliefs in experimental settings and the elicitation of aggregate beliefs in
market settings. Appendix D draws additional connections with the vast literature in this area,
connecting our approach to antecedents.
The reader interested in experimental procedures might skip section 2 initially, and return to
it to see where our procedures fit into the broader approaches to belief elicitation. The reader
interested in adjustments to elicited beliefs to “correct” for risk attitudes might skip sections 2 and 3
initially. The econometric methodology for recovering latent subjective beliefs is equally applicable
to alternative methods for eliciting beliefs, such as scoring rule procedures.
Our approach brings together ideas that have been presented in different parts of several
literatures. Appendix D documents these connections in more detail.
The notion that probabilities can be usefully viewed as prices at which one might trade has
been a common one in statistics, and is associated with de Finetti [1937][1970] and Savage [1971]. It
is also clear, of course, in the vast literature on gambling, particularly on the setting of odds by
bookies and parimutuel markets (Epstein [1977; p. 298ff.]). The central insight is that a subjective
probability is a marginal rate of substitution between contingent claims, where the contingency is the
event that the probability refers to. There are then a myriad of ways in which one can operationalize
2 For example, one could elicit the p that makes the subject indifferent between a lottery paying M
with probability p and m with probability p, for M>m, and a lottery paying M if the event occurs and m if it
does not (Marschak [1964; p. 107ff.]). This method formally requires that one elicit indifference, which raises
procedural problems. But the basic idea of the method could also be applied to elicit probability intervals, in
much the same manner that we elicit probability intervals. 
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this notion of a marginal rate of substitution.2
The formal link between scoring rules and optimizing decisions by agents is also familiar,
particularly in Savage [1971], Kadane and Winkler [1987][1988] and Hanson [2003]. Jose, Nau, and
Winkler [2007] stress the interpretation of several popular scoring rules from the perspective of an
expected utility maximizing agent with preferences derived from familiar utility functions. Their
approach may be viewed as complementary to ours: if one knows the utility function of the agent,
they show which scoring rule is incentive compatible. We start with an arbitrary utility function and
belief betting game, which can be viewed as derived from a particular scoring rule, and draw
statistical inferences about subjective beliefs.
Finally, the constructive task of “recovering” subjective beliefs from observed betting
behavior or responses to scoring rules has been directly attacked by Offerman, Sonnemans, van de
Kuilen and Wakker [2007; §6]. Like us, they consider the recovery of true subjective beliefs when the
agent may be risk averse in the narrow sense of EUT, as well as the broader sense implied by an
allowance for probability weighting. Their approach has a reduced form simplicity, and is actually
agnostic about which structural model of decision making under risk one uses. Our approach is
explicitly structural, and generates inferences about subjective beliefs that are conditional on the
assumed model of decision making under risk. We see these as complementary approaches, and
both have strengths and weaknesses.
Our statistical approach uses the notion of joint estimation of preference parameters from
several complementary experimental tasks. Intuitively, a series of lottery tasks with objective
3 Depending on how the subject perceives the task, one might also want to adjust choices for loss
aversion. If the subject bets on the wrong horse, they lose their stake. Thus in Table 1 there is always one
negative amount in the “A wins” and “B wins” columns of earnings. It is arguable that when the subject if
forced to bet on each bookie, and the stake is provided by the experimenter, that there is no loss involved,
since the subject simply does not earn a positive amount. But when we allow the subject the option of not
betting on a particular bookie, and keeping the stake, the prospect of a loss may trigger loss aversion. In effect
this is a simple extensions of the type of calibration required for risk aversion or probability weighting.
4 This corresponds to the “no stakes” condition stressed by Kadane and Winkler [1986][1988]. It is
redundant when subjects are risk neutral, but essential when one deviates from that special case.
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probabilities allow us to estimate the parameters of a latent model of decision making under risk,
which then allows us to identify subjective beliefs from a belief betting task. These parameters and
subjective beliefs are estimated using joint maximum likelihood methods, such as applied in other
experimental settings by Andersen, Harrison, Lau and Rutström [2005]. One insight from this joint
estimation approach is that uncertainty about the core parameters of utility functions and/or
probability weighting functions affects inferences that can be made about subjective beliefs, as they
should. The estimation of subjective beliefs is not a simple matter.
1. An Elicitation Procedure
A. The Basic Idea
Assume for the moment that the subject is risk neutral and does not distort subjective
probabilities when evaluating lotteries.3 The subject is asked to state their belief that event A will
occur instead of event B, where A and B are mutually exclusive. Assume that the subject has no
stake in whether A or B occurs other than the bets being made with these bookies.4 Let the subject
be told that there are nine bookies willing to take a bet at stated odds. Table 1 shows the house
probabilities of each outcome and the associated house odds. The odds are stated in columns 3 and
4 in the form that they are naturally stated in the field: what is the amount that the subject would get
for a $1 bet if the indicated event occurred? In columns 1 and 2 the same odds are represented in
5 One difference between our approach and the field counterparts is that we only state “competitive
odds” in which the betting house “take” is zero if there are equal numbers of bettors on each side of the
market. To see the parallel to field betting odds, it is worthwhile translating field odds that include a house
take into implicit beliefs. Essentially, one has to define the exhaustive set of events, calculate the implied
house probability of all events, and normalize the probabilities by that sum. Consider the odds quoted in May
2006 by one betting house, William Hill, for the winner of Group B of the 2006 World Cap. These were
England at 1.57, Sweden at 3.00, Paraguay at 8.00 and poor old Trinidad & Tobago at 34.00. The reciprocal of
these odds on wagers of 1 unit are 0.64, 0.33, 0.13 and 0.03, which sums to 1.125. So the house take here is
12.5%: if it ended up with a “balanced book” in which wagers were placed on each outcome in inverse
proportion to odds, it would earn $1.125 for every $1 bet with no risk. We can take the house take away, and
re-normalize the implied probabilities of each outcome to be 0.57 (= 0.64 ÷ 1.125), 0.30, 0.11 and 0.03. This
adjustment does not much help the chances of the hapless Trinidad & Tobago team, but it does make a
noticeable change for the England and Sweden outcomes. With this adjustment, our experimental instrument
can be extended to reflect practice in the field even more closely, and we can still infer house probabilities.
6 We discuss variants throughout, and in particular in Appendix C. In one variant they can also decide
what fraction of a $10 stake they would like to bet, and then whether they want to bet on A or B. In a more
complex variant we elicit the subject’s true belief about the event A and, using this information, provide the
subject with their expected income. This information is designed to show the subject some of the
consequences of their choice, so that we are not jointly eliciting beliefs and testing cognitive prowess at such
calculations.
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terms of an implied probability of the event. Thus the odds of A occurring are simply the reciprocal
of the probability of A, so a probability of 0.1 implies odds of $10: a $1 bet would return a gross
payout of $10 and a net payout of $9. Some people (academics) find probabilities easier to
understand, and some people (everyone else) seem to find odds easier to understand, so we provide
both.5
In our base design6 the subject is simply asked to decide how they want to bet with each of
the nine bookies: do they want to bet on A or B? Their “switch point,” over the nine bookies, is
then used to infer their subjective belief. Our basic procedure has a striking familiarity with
“multiple price list” procedures for the elicitation of risk attitudes (Holt and Laury [2002]), discount
rates (Harrison, Lau and Williams [2002]) and valuations for goods (Andersen et el. [2007]).
Consider a subject that has a personal belief that A will occur with probability ¾. Assume
that the subject has to place a bet with each bookie, knowing that only one of these books will
actually be played out. The odds offered by a particular bookie are shown on a given row, so
7 The net earnings are the payoffs that our experimental subjects would earn, since their $1 stake is
given to them by the experimenter. In the field the better would receive the gross payoffs.
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different rows correspond to different bookies. The subject would rationally bet on A for every
bookie offering odds that corresponded to a lower house probability of A winning than ¾, and then
switch over to bet on B for every bookie offering odds that corresponded to a higher house
probability of A winning than ¾. These bets are shown in Table 1, and imply net earnings of $9 or -
$1 with the first bookie, $4.00 or -$1 with the second bookie, and so on.7 The expected net earnings
from each bookie can then be calculated using the subjective belief of ¾ that the subject stated.
Hence the expected net earnings from the first bookie are (¾ × $9) + (¼ × -$1) = $6.50, and so on
for the other bookies. Average expected income from bets optimally laid is $1.58 = $14.20 ÷ 9.
This logic is illustrated in panel A of Figure 1. This shows the certainty equivalent of the
optimal bet for this risk neutral subject for each of the house odds listed on the horizontal axes. The
odds and probabilities listed across the horizontal axis correspond to the odds and probabilities
listed down the rows of Table 1. One line shows the outcome if there is a bet on A, and the other
line shows the outcome if there is a bet on B. At the probability ¾ these two lines cross, reflecting
the fact that the subject is indifferent between betting on A and B when visiting the bookie offering
exactly this house probability. For lower house probabilities the subject optimally bets on A instead
of B, and for higher house probabilities the subject optimally bets on B instead of A. Thus we can
directly infer the subjective probability from the point at which the subject switches bets.
The flat line at $1 in panel A of Figure 1 corresponds to the certainty-equivalent of the stake.
For now it is simply a reference point, to see that the subject can expect to increase his expected
income over the stake by placing the optimal bet. Since we force the subject to place bets on each
and every bookie, it does not represent a choice for the subject. Since the subject is assumed to be
risk neutral, it would not affect betting behavior even if it was an option: as long as the experimental
8 The same methodological point about the need for joint inference arises in other settings. Harrison
and Rutström [2008; §3.1] demonstrate that statements about the curvature of the utility function in the
multiple price list task of Holt and Laury [2002] depend on what is assumed about the extent of probability
weighting. If it is assumed away, then one can infer that curvature directly from observed behavior, as
illustrated by the CRRA intervals reported by Holt and Laury [2002; Table 3, p.1649]. Andersen et al. [2005]
demonstrate that statements about the discount rate over utility streams in the multiple price list task of
Harrison, Lau and Williams [2002] depend on what is assumed about the curvature of the utility function. If it
is assumed to be linear, then one can infer discount rates directly from observed behavior (with some
additional assumptions), as illustrated by Coller and Williams [2002; Table 1, p.1610].
9 The value of 0.57 is the average predicted value from experiments reported in Harrison, Johnson,
McInnes and Rutström [2005] for U.S. college students, and is consistent with estimates obtained by many
other experimenters with comparable samples and stakes (e.g., Holt and Laury [2002]). Unless otherwise
noted, references to “risk attitudes” are synonymous with references to the concavity or convexity of the
utility function.
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subject makes has a positive expected net earnings from a bet in each row, the subject would place a
bet even if they had the opportunity not to.
When we allow for risk attitudes or probability distortion, we need to adjust the observed
response to correct for the effect that these behavioral characteristics imply on optimal betting
behavior that differs from the risk neutral prediction. In effect, we have to make a joint inference
about the subjective probability, risk attitude, and probability weighting of the subject.8
B. Correcting for Risk Aversion
Consider a subject who is risk averse, again holding a subjective belief of ¾ that A will
occur. Assume further that subject has a Constant Relative Risk Aversion (CRRA) utility function
defined by
U(y) = (y1- r )/(1- r), (1.1)
where r  is the CRRA coefficient and is set equal to 0.57 for this illustration.9 Assume further, for
now, that the subject behaves consistently with EUT; our approach to calibration generalizes to
non-EUT models, as illustrated later. Armed with these parametric assumptions we can recalculate
the payoffs in certainty equivalent terms for binary choice the subject can take: bet on A or bet on B.
10 Although rare, it is perfectly possible to conduct prediction markets for a “closed” set of
participants who have no option but to place bets with funds provided by the experimenter solely for that
purpose: see Gruca, Berg and Cipriano [2003], for example.
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The new certainty equivalents that allow for risk aversion are shown in panel B of Figure 1.
It is clear that this risk averse subject will bet on A at all house probabilities in the discrete range
0.1,0.2,......0.9 when she is forced to bet her $1 stake on either A or on B, since the certainty
equivalent of the risky $1 bet on A is always higher than the certainty equivalent for the risky $1 bet
on B for these house probabilities. Thus the observed behavior of a subject that is risk neutral is very different
from the observed behavior of a subject that holds exactly the same subjective belief but is risk averse. One cannot
recover the subjective belief without correcting observed behavior for the risk attitudes of the
subject. Since we have forced bets, this risk averse agent bets in a manner that would be incorrectly
interpreted as implying a higher  subjective probability than ¾ if we incorrectly assumed he was risk neutral.
Panel B of Figure 1 also makes it clear that these forced risky bets are worse than not betting
at all whenever house probabilities are in the range 0.52 to 0.94. The ability not to bet, or at least not
to bet very much, matters to this risk averse subject. As would be expected for a risk averse subject,
and unlike the case for a risk neutral subject, when the house probabilities are close to the subject’s
beliefs, not much betting will take place when the subject has the option not to.
The absence of betting, when it is an option for the subject, is worth pausing over since it is
a key feature for all prediction markets open to the public.10 In our elicitation mechanism we are still
able to recover the true belief of the subject, since that was needed to identify which bookies were
worth betting with, and assuming some relevant variation in the odds offered by different bookies.
But if we simply observed the bets of the subject, what would we infer? We could infer that the
subject believed that A would occur with probability greater than 0.5 and less than 0.9, which is not
11 One could imagine a longer list of bookies, arrayed in finer increments of odds, but this would not
provide significant improvement on the possible inferences from the observed bets alone.
12 If the free range option is not all or none, but allows partial bets out of the stake, then there would
be some limited market activity in the range of house prices between 0.5 to 0.9.
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particularly informative.11 It is not a wrong inference, since the true belief is ¾ by assumption, but it
is not very precise. Moreover, the sample selection issues that occur as one moves from “forced
betting” to “free range betting” are suggestive of the deeper difficulty of making inferences about
true beliefs from market odds based solely on realized bets, since this subject would not have had
any impact on the market within this wide range.12
An additional implication of allowing for the absence of betting concerns the temporal
difference between the investment in the bet (today) and the expected payoff (tomorrow). When
subjects place a bet today they give up the stake: virtually every betting house requires that bets be
covered immediately with transfers of funds. But the payout is defined in terms of future dollars. So
any bettor must discount the future payouts, conditional on outcome, to compare with the current
outlay. This implies that individual discount rates, and their heterogeneity across traders, must play a
role in inferring individual beliefs from naturally occurring bets. 
C. Correcting for Probability Weighting
If the subject engages in probability weighting, the correction is a simple one. If we know the
probability weighting function w(B) that the subject uses, then we infer w(B) and then simply apply
the inverse function w -1(B) to recover B. Of course, as with the correction for risk aversion due to
curvature of the utility function, we need to account for the fact that we will only be able to obtain
estimates of w(B), and that the standard errors in that estimation will propagate and generate
uncertainty in our final inference about B. Nonetheless, this is just an extension of the notion that
we have to recover the latent subjective belief from observed behavior, and need to make some
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theoretical and statistics assumptions to do so.
To anticipate an important formal issue, we stress that we are focusing here on decision
makers that are “probabilistically sophisticated” in the sense of Machina and Schmeidler [1992;
p.747]. Such decision makers are assumed to behave as if they employ subjective probabilities of
events and utilities of outcomes that are independent of the assignment of outcomes to events. One
important contribution of non-EUT models of decision making under risk is to relax that
independence, but it is not the only contribution. We focus on the Rank-Dependant Utility (RDU)
model as an alternative to EUT to illustrate the key ideas.
To be specific, one can state a probabilistically sophisticated version of RDU in which
individuals have subjective beliefs B and then form decision weights from those beliefs using the
probability weighting function w(B) and some assumption about rank-dependent weighting of
outcomes (e.g., Quiggin [1982]). But one can also state less restrictive versions of RDU in which
decisions makers violate probabilistic sophistication (e.g., Schmeidler [1989]); Quiggin [1993; §5.7]
reviews the differences. To be clear, we do not know how to meaningfully recover subjective beliefs
when decision makers are not  probabilistically sophisticated, but we are subjectively confident
nobody else does as well.
D. Precision of Inferences about Beliefs
Recovering beliefs from observed behavior entails some imprecision to the extent that we
only have estimates of the utility function and/or the probability weighting function of the agent.
Even if we assume EUT and calculate a point estimate that the subject is risk neutral (r=0, as
parameterized here), there will be some standard error around that point estimate and hence some
imprecision about true beliefs. We just have to live with this imprecision, and do our best to recover
what we can. The econometric implications of this point are spelled out in §3 with an illustrative
13 Hanson [1996; p. 1224] provides a useful reminder that discrete implementations of proper scoring
rules can also engender piecewise linear opportunity sets. He points out that certain regions of the QSR
implemented by McKelvey and Page [1990] were actually linear scoring rules, and that subjects would then
rationally report a probability at the extremes of that linear region, and not at the discrete alternative closest to
their true belief.
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application.
But there is another source of imprecision about subjective beliefs, due to the discrete nature
of the opportunity set being presented to subjects. To see this, assume that we know with absolute
precision that the agent is risk averse and has a CRRA utility function with r=0.57, and does not
engage in probability weighting. Our house probabilities vary in increments of 0.1 between 0.1 and
0.9, and we assumed an agent with true beliefs ¾. This agent would bet on event A with every
bookie. He would only switch to betting on event B if a bookie offered a house probability of A of
0.93 or better. But in our coarse grid we do not have a house probability greater than 0.9, so we
would not be able to detect such a switch. Nor would we be able to tell this agent, with an assumed
belief of ¾, apart from an agent with subjective beliefs between 0.73 and 1. In other words, agents
with beliefs in the interval [0.73, 1] would be observationally equivalent. Hence, from the observation
that the agent selected A from all bookies, and even with the absolutely precise knowledge that his
r=0.57, we can only infer his true beliefs as coming from some interval.
The solution to this source of imprecision is to explore different opportunity sets for betting.
Intuitively, one obvious solution is to concavify the opportunity set, which we current have as
linear.13 Another solution, perhaps less obviously, is to allow “free range” betting so that we obtain
more information from the observed betting behavior about risk attitudes and hence inferred
subjective beliefs. Another solution, even less obvious, is to allow agents to place bets on more than
one bookie for payment. The evaluation of these solutions requires a more general framework,
presented in §2, and connects our approach to the traditional literature on scoring rules. We also
14 Alternative geometrical treatments of different scoring rules are provided by de Finetti [1962],
Murphy and Staël von Holstein [1975] and Staël von Holstein and Murphy [1978].
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show there how one can arbitrarily approximate the general opportunity sets with our simple
“linear” experimental frame.
2. A Formal Model of Belief Elicitation as a Betting Game
This elicitation framework can be formally viewed from the perspective of a trading game
between two agents. This framework provides several insights. First, traditional scoring rules can be
interpreted consistently with each other, allowing comparisons of theoretical performance
characteristics. Second, one can compare scoring rule procedures with prediction markets in a
consistent framework, allowing insights from the former to inform debates on the proper
interpretation of outcomes from the latter. Third, one can provide a theoretical micro-foundation
for field counterparts of belief elicitation games that take the form of betting markets, as well as our
laboratory implementation of those field procedures. Finally, the role of risk aversion and probability
weighting can be identified systematically, providing a latent theoretical structure for our
econometric estimation procedures in §4.
Our theoretical framework can be explained best by a series of visual examples.14 We provide
a more formal mathematical statement in Appendix A. We then present the special case
implemented in our experiments. The relationship to the literature is discussed at some length in §6,
apart from references to specific results in the literature along the way.
A. Basic Logic
Consider an agent that is given an endowment of tickets. Each ticket can be used to
purchase state-contingent claim that pay $1 if either of states A or B occur, where B is the
15  In general, if ri denotes the reported probability of state i, and qi denotes the true probability of
state i, then the penalty is (qi - ri)2. Staël von Holstein and Murphy [1978] provide a general characterization of
the family of quadratic scoring rules, showing that many popular scoring rules can be seen as special cases.
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complement of A. The standard quadratic scoring rule can be defined as follows. The subject
receives a fixed amount S>0, from which is subtracted an amount equal to the square of error in the
report. This amount is deflated by some scalar T before being subtracted from S. If r1 denotes the
reported probability of state A occurring, the penalty is just (1-r1)2 if state A occurs and r12 if state B
occurs.15
 Figure 2 displays an Edgeworth Box that represents the opportunity set that this subject
faces if we confront him with a standard quadratic scoring rule penalty function. The vertical axis
from the bottom-left origin shows the wealth that the agent ends up with if state B obtains, and the
horizontal axis shows the wealth that the agent ends up with if state A obtains. In effect, the
Edgeworth Box construct reminds us that this elicitation task is essentially a trading game between the
experimenter and the agent. The size of this box represents the stake that the experimenter puts on the
table, which we have normalized here to $1 in either state, but which could obviously vary up or
down.
Now consider the beliefs and preferences of the agent. Start with an agent that is known to
risk-neutral, loss-neutral, and does not distort probabilities. Further assume that our agent has true
subjective beliefs that lead him to expect state A to occur with a 60% chance. Because the agent
holds these beliefs, he is willing at the margin of his initial endowment of tickets to trade off state B
tickets for state A tickets at a rate of 60-to-40, or 1½-to-1. And because the agent is assumed to be
risk neutral, he only cares about the expected value of his wealth after the state is realized, so he does
not care about the variance in his expected income. Thus his indifference curves, shown in Figure 3
on the same Edgeworth Box, are linear with a slope given by the ratio of his subjective beliefs. Each
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indifference curve can be indexed by the expected value of wealth, where the expectation is taken
with respect to the agent’s true beliefs.
Faced with the opportunity set in Figure 2, and with these subjective beliefs and risk
preferences, the optimal behavior for the agent is to report that state A will occur with 60% chance.
We illustrate this result in Figure 4. The optimal outcome for the agent is shown as point x*, which
generates an expected income of 64 cents if state B obtains and 84 cents if state A obtains. With the
subjective probabilities of these being 0.6 and 0.4, the expected income to the agent is therefore 76
cents (= $0.64 × 0.4 + $0.84 × 0.6). This expected income maximizes expected utility for this agent.
Any other report would be sub-optimal. For example, a report that state A would occur with 50%
chance, when the agent truly believed that it would occur with 60% chance, would shift x* to the no-
risk 45N line, which has an expected income of only 75 cents as shown with the “magnification glass”
in Figure 5. Any false report would generate a lower expected income than the true report.
So far we have only provided an alternative, and familiar, characterization of properties of
the quadratic scoring rule that are well known. But this characterization generalizes in nice ways,
discussed later.
Recovering Beliefs from Elicited Reports
Now consider the effect of knowing that the agent has a particular risk attitude. Using the
quadratic scoring rule, Figures 6, 7 and 8 overlay the outcome for an agent that has a CRRA
coefficient equal to 0.57 for this illustration. The agent has the same beliefs, but optimally reports
something other than those true beliefs. That is the bad news, although not disastrously so as we
shall see, since we can calibrate the true beliefs if we have information about the subject’s risk
attitude. The good news is that the agent is more motivated than the risk neutral agent to provide
that report. One way to see this last result is to observe in Figure 8 that the payoff function for the
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CRRA agent is more concave than the corresponding payoff function for the risk neutral agent,
where payoffs are measured in terms of certainty equivalent income. 
The risk averse agent tends to report probabilities under the QSR that are closer to ½ than
their true beliefs. The intuition here is simple enough, since the agent is putting less of their eggs in
the two extreme event-outcome baskets. Thus, if we know that the agent is risk averse, we should
take the observed reports are recover true, subjective beliefs as some probability that is more
extreme than the report. This is the opposite of the adjustment needed in the procedure we introduced
in §1, where we assumed that agents were forced to bet on one or other event outcome. The
reconciliation comes from recognizing that the analysis of the QSR is in effect allowing the agent to
pick any point on the opportunity set in Figures 6, 7 and 8, rather than the extreme end-points of
each opportunity set. Our forced-fed treatment in §1 forces the agent to the end-points of (linear)
opportunity sets, as we illustrate below in §2B.
We can generalize the approach to belief elicitation to virtually any well-behaved utility
function that might be used to characterize risk attitudes. Furthermore, we can extend the analysis
numerically to consider alternatives to EUT, such as RDU and CPT. This extension is best
illustrated in §3 when we have more structure on the specific application we provide.
Improving Incentives to Report Accurately
This general framework allows one to easily “see” how to improve the strength of the
incentives for reporting one’s beliefs accurately. The opportunity set for the quadratic scoring rule is
simply a particular specification of a CES indifference curve in a 2-person pure exchange game. The
formal proof of this assertion is in Appendix A, but the basic idea is straightforward enough. A risk
averse CRRA agent is assumed to hold beliefs b(s) about a finite list of n states s0S, such that
b(s)>0, 3S b(s)=1. The agent has a certainty equivalent (CE) wealth function: 
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CE = [ 3S b(s) x(s)(1-r)/r ]1/(1-r) (2.1)
This expression  for the CRRA agent’s CE is in standard CES form, where the elasticity of
substitution 0 =1/r is the reciprocal of the Arrow-Pratt relative risk aversion parameter r, and is a
measure of risk tolerance.
Consider the CRRA agent’s optimal choice problem in a competitive contingent claims
market where unit s-contingent claims can be bought or sold at prices p(s)>0, 3S p(s)=1. A unit of
s-contingent wealth pays $1 if state s occurs and $0 otherwise, for all states s=1,2....n. The
expenditure minimization problem for a CRRA agent in such a market is to minimize  m=3S
p(s)x(s) subject to a certainty equivalent constraint. This yields Hicksian compensated demand
functions xc(s) for wealth in state s:
xc(s) = CE ×{[b(s)/(p(s)] / [ 3š [b(š)/x(š)]1-r/r ]1/1-r }1/r = CE × 6 (2.2)
for š0S. Embed these compensated demands in an Edgeworth Box of size T(s) so that the
opportunity set faced by the subject is:
T(s) - xc(s) = T(s) - (CE × 6) (2.3)
The quadratic scoring rule is a special case of this CES form in which n=2 (so s={A, B}), b(s)=½
œs, CE=¼, r=½, T(s)=1 œs, and the subject’s reports are the market prices p(s); in this case, b(s) is
interpreted as a parameter rather than as true beliefs.
The generality of this CES-in-an-Edgeworth-box perspective provides the experimenter 
with great control over the shape and position of the incentives faced by the subject. There is, of
course, no reason to restrict the analysis to a CES form: in principle, the compensated demands
from any indirect utility function will suffice. An important question for further research is to
identify flexible functional forms for indifference curves that provide better or worse incentives for
particular kinds of experimental subjects.
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Restating and Comparing Other Elicitation Procedures
It is possible to re-state other popular scoring rules in the same general framework, and
thereby compare their properties. This also provides insights into the design of experiments that can
allow one to evaluate alternative procedures, such as the claims that competitive “prediction
markets” generate prices that reflect aggregate beliefs in some sense.
For example consider the log scoring rule proposed by Good [1952;  p.112] and extended by
Bernardo [1979]. In its simplest version, this scoring rule assigns a number, log(p), to a probability
report p for some event. Since 0#p#1, the simple log score is a penalty score, a negative number.
Also, since the log function is increasing, higher reported probabilities p for an event receive higher
scores (lower penalties), with a maximum score (minimum penalty) of zero when the reported
probability p=1. The more general version of the log scoring rule (Bernardo and Smith [1994; p. 73])
is a state-dependent linear transformation of the simple Log score:  k(s) + J × log [b(s)/p(s)], where
b(s) is a probability report for state S=s from a discrete set of states and a probability mass function
b=[b(1), b(2),....b(n)] such that  b(s)>0,  3S b(s)=1; p(s) can be thought of as a reference probability
report such that p(s)>0,  3S p(s)=1; and k(s) and J>0 are constants.
With an appropriate specification of parameters this general log scoring rule describes an
indifference curve for a CARA agent in contingent commodity space. The logic here is the same as
for a CRRA agent. Consider a CARA agent’s optimal choice problem in a competitive contingent
claims market where unit s-contingent claims can be bought or sold at prices p(s). The expenditure
minimization problem for this agent is to minimize  m= 3S p(s) x(s) subject to a certainty equivalent 
constraint that -exp[-CE/t]  = -3S b(s) exp[-x(2)/t]. This yields the Hicksian compensated demand
functions xc(s) for wealth in state s: xc(s)= CE + J × log [b(s)/p(s)]. Embedding these compensated
demands in an Edgeworth Box of size w(s), the opportunity set faced by the subject is
T(s) - xc(s)= w(s) - {CE + J × log [b(s)/p(s)]}, (2.4)
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which is clearly of the general log scoring rule form. Holding T(s), CE, J and b(s) constant, and 
varying market prices p(s), we trace out a CARA indifference curve in contingent commodity space.
If a scoring rule is just an opportunity set defined by the experimenter and described by an
indifference curve in an Edgeworth box, then the optimization problem facing an experimental
subject with a well defined utility function is a trading game. To maximize her own preferences, the
subject will want to select an allocation of the available aggregate contingent wealth w(s) where her
highest  indifference curve is just tangent to the indifference curve defined by the scoring rule
opportunity set. She can implement this allocation in the experiment by reporting suitably
normalized general competitive equilibrium prices for contingent commodities as her probability
reports. This is worth repeating: optimal reports for a scoring rule elicitation task are general
competitive equilibrium prices in a 2-person game of pure exchange.
Figure 7 shows how the subject optimally reports (0.573, 0.427) in the trading game between
a CRRA agent with beliefs (0.6, 0.4) and risk aversion parameter r=0.57 when facing the standard
quadratic scoring rule. The reports (0.573, 0.427) are general competitive equilibrium prices for the
two contingent wealth commodities in this 2 person game: relative prices  are defined by the slope of
the tangency line, 1.342 (= 0.573÷0.427), between the two indifference curves. These competitive
market prices do not directly reveal the  beliefs of the trading agent. If competitive equilibrium
prices in a controlled experimental setting do not directly reveal beliefs, then how likely is it that
contingent claims prices in real world prediction markets directly reveal beliefs of the participating
agents? Moreover,  if knowledge of the subject’s utility functions in an experiment, along with other
features of the trading game such as the aggregate wealth at stake and the shape of the opportunity
set (indifference curves) of the other trader, are needed to uncover latent beliefs for one
experimental subject, how can we claim to be recovering aggregate beliefs without comparable
information on the participants in a real world prediction market? In effect, these questions
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generalize the concerns expressed by Manski [2006] about the extent to which prediction markets
reveal aggregate beliefs in any meaningful sense (e.g., the mean of the distribution of individual
beliefs across agents active in the market).
To be more precise in a simple model where we can be explicit, set up a trading game with
the log scoring rule, where the opportunity set is described by an indifference curve for a CARA
agent with beliefs b(s) about states, b(s)>0, 3S b(s)=1, risk tolerance ¬, aggregate contingent wealth
is w(s), and suppose we are trying to elicit beliefs from a second CARA agent with beliefs a(s) about
states, a(s)>0, 3S a(s)=1, and risk tolerance Z.  The general competitive equilibrium relative prices
p(s) turn out to have an analytically tractable form with p(s) proportional to
a(s)Z/(Z+¬) b(s)¬/(Z+¬) e-w(s)/(Z+¬),
where the final factor of proportionality makes all prices sum to unity (Fountain [2003]). Thus,
general equilibrium contingent claims relative prices are a weighted geometric mean of the individual
agents’ relative beliefs, with each agent’s beliefs a(s) and b(s) about state s weighted by their relative
risk tolerances, all adjusted for an aggregate wealth risk scaled back by the aggregate risk tolerance of
the traders. Of course, with homogeneous beliefs and no aggregate wealth risk (w(s)= w(t) all s,t) 
market prices will directly reflect underlying beliefs, but no trading will take place in this case. Once
there is some diversity in beliefs and risk attitudes, market prices will diverge from the arithmetic
average of participants’ beliefs, and increasingly so the more heterogeneity there is.
In Appendix A we present more general results on the extent to which prediction markets
can recover aggregate beliefs. We allow for CRRA and log utility specifications, and show that while
prediction markets may predict, they do not generally recover aggregate beliefs.
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B. Our Elicitation Procedure as a Special Case
The elicitation procedure we implement in §3 flows from our general perspective on the
belief elicitation task as an exchange game. We know that subjects have difficulty learning and
understanding what a (proper) scoring rule is, which makes it difficult for them to behave sensibly or
optimally when faced with one. Why not present a scoring rule opportunity set to them in terms that
are likely to be familiar to them, such as choosing points along a simple budget set or setting prices
in a betting market?  Our economic reinterpretation of scoring rules as indifference-curves-in-a-box
lets us do precisely that.
From duality theory we know that the points along any indifference curve can be traced out
in two ways. One direct way is in terms of contingent wealth claims. The indirect way is by
specifying tangent lines, with the interpretation of relative market prices, that would make any
particular point on the indifference curve an optimal choice in the budget set implicitly described by
the tangent line to the indifference curve.
Our experimental design exploits this duality by having the subject take on one of two
potential roles.
In the first role, as outlined in §1,  she can reveal her beliefs directly by her choices of
contingent wealth claims from a finite list of bets. The bets we chose there earlier in fact lie along a
linear opportunity set defined in contingent commodity space by the $1 stake and the house  prices.
This line can be viewed as the limit of a CES indifference curve in a 2-event contingent commodity
space through an endowment point (1,1). In a “forced fed” design we restrict the subjects’ choices
to the end-points or  intercepts of that budget line, corresponding to spending all of the stake on
either one or other of the two contingent commodities. In a “free range” design we increase the
number of discrete points along the budget line, and implicitly include a “no-bet” option. In either
case, when these choices are analyzed jointly with other choices designed to elicit risk attitudes, the
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experimenter can draw inferences about the subjects’ beliefs.  Conditional on knowing something
about the subject’s risk attitude we can infer bounds on her beliefs from her choices.
We view this role as the most natural one for subjects to adopt, since they essentially place
bets at given house odds.
Alternatively, our experimental design permits the subject to move along an opportunity set
indirectly, by taking the role of the brokerage house and setting contingent claims prices. In this
representation beliefs are revealed by price setting behavior, or odds setting behavior in the language
of naturally occurring betting markets. In this case the opportunity set defined by the CES Hicksian
compensated demands for contingent claims  can be viewed as the demands of a computer-
generated subject, “RoboPunters.” When reporting competitive market odds, or relative prices, to a
particular RoboPunter, the subject reveals information which can be used to infer her beliefs after
calibration for risk attitudes. Varying the opportunity set facing the subject can be viewed as
providing her with a heterogeneous range of punters. Both “forced fed” and “free range” treatments
are also feasible in this frame. We do not view this role as the most natural one for typical subjects
to take, but might be more natural for expert decision-makers in some settings.
Returning to the experimental frame we adopted, Figure 11 illustrates the opportunity sets
presented to subjects in our experiments. In panel A we show the opportunity set presented by one
bookie, based on a house probability of ½. The budget line facing the subject is linear, but otherwise
the logic is the same as our general framework. The dashed lines show the indifference curves over
the two state-contingent wealth claims, and since this is a risk neutral agent they are linear. The
subject is assumed to hold a subjective belief B=0.65, so the slope of the indifference curves reflects
that rate of subjective transformation between wealth when A is the outcome and wealth when B is
the outcome. This subject would optimally select A to win in this instance, maximizing expected
income.
16 The house probabilities of 0.5, 0.6, 0.7 and 0.8 generate an EV for a bet on A of $1.30, $1.08, $0.93
and $0.81, and an EV for a bet on B of $0.70, $0.88, $1.17 and $1.75, respectively.
17 The house probabilities of 0.5, 0.6, 0.7 and 0.8 generate a CE for a bet on A of $0.914, $0.762,
$0.652 and $0.572, and an EV for a bet on B of $0.296, $0.37, $0.494 and $0.742, respectively.
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Panel B of Figure 11 extends this environment to allow the subject to face 4 bookies instead
of 1. The solid lines show the budget sets presented by each bookie, and the associated house
probabilities are shown beside each budget line. These bookies are selecting odds based on house
probabilities of A winning of 0.5, 0.6, 0.7 and 0.8. The risk neutral agent on the left of panel B picks
bet A from the bookies offering house probabilities of 0.5 and 0.6, but then optimally switches to
bet B from the bookies offering house probabilities of 0.7 and 0.8.16 Thus the elicitation procedure
correctly identifies this subject as having a true belief in the closed interval [0.6, 0.7].
The risk averse agent on the right of panel B of Figure 11 faces the same opportunity set
defined by these 4 bookies, but chooses differently. In this case the indifference curves are non-
linear, reflecting a CRRA parameter of 0.45. The agent switches from betting on A to betting on B
only when the house probability is between 0.7 and 0.8, even though his subjective belief is still just
0.65.17 Thus one would need to recover the correct belief by adjusting for risk attitudes in this
instance, and the true belief is not directly observable from the choices the subject makes.
C. Approximating the General Case
It is an easy matter to see how the special case used in our experimental frame can be used to
approximate arbitrarily well the general, concave opportunity sets discussed in §A. The basic idea is
to use that frame to take piecewise linear approximations of the concave opportunity set. There are
two approaches that can be used.
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Approximation When Only One Bookie is Used for Payment
The outer envelope of panel B of Figure 11 traces out a convex opportunity set. In this case
we know by revealed preference that no better would want to place a bet in the interior of this
envelope. So with enough betting houses we can approximate a convex opportunity set in this
manner.
The same idea can be extended to a concave opportunity set, which is more interesting for
belief elicitation. The construction is based on Figure 11 again. Allow the bettors facing house
probabilities of 0.5, in one betting house, to have a higher stake to wager than the bettors in the
bookies offering house probabilities greater than 0.5. This raises the budget set for this bookie up,
and/or the budget sets for the other bookies down: the relative shift is all that is needed in this
construction. Then we have to place a cap on how much one can bet (or earn) from any one bookie,
to ensure that the outer envelope only consists of portions of the budget set from each bookie. So
the bookie offering house probabilities of 0.5 is only willing to take bets up to a certain amount,
which means that the relevant budget set is truncated, and only contributes the “top left” part of the
concave opportunity set. Similarly for the other bookies.
The upshot is that the same frame that we use for our experiments can be adapted to
approximate any opportunity set, such as the QSR. The subjects are again told that there are a finite
number of bookies offering house probabilities, but now we (a) vary the stake they have to bet with
each bookie, and (b) place minimum and maximum bets that can be placed with each bookie. Of
course, in this manner we are free to approximate any concave opportunity set, and not just the one
implied by the QSR.
Approximation When All Bookies Are Used for Payment
An even simpler way of using the experimental frame to approximate an arbitrary concave
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opportunity set arises if we let the subject be paid for all bets on all bookies. In effect, we let the
subject create a portfolio of bets across all bookies. The subject is then assumed to maximize over
the set of portfolios available.
To see this construction, assume we have two betting houses, " and $, respectively offering
house probabilities of 0.75 and 0.4 that event A will occur. For the moment assume our forced fed
environment, where the agent has to bet all on A or all on B in each betting house. Then the
possible portfolio consists of 4 combinations. Betting on A with both houses generates ($4, $1.67),
betting on B with both houses generates ($1.33, $2.50), betting on A with " and B with $ generates
($4, $2.50), and betting on B with " and A with $ generates ($1.33, $1.67), where the amounts in
brackets refer to outcomes from each betting house (the first element is the amount earned from
bookie " if the event occurs, and the second element is the amount earned from bookie $ if the
event occurs). Hence the implied state-contingent wealth outcomes are {$5.67, $0}, {$0, $3.83},
{$4, $2.50} and {$1.67, $1.33}, respectively, where the elements in curly brackets refer to state-
contingent outcomes from these combinations of bets (the first element is the payoff if event A
occurs, and the second element is the payoff if event B occurs). The last of these 4 wealth outcomes
is dominated, but the other three trace out a discrete set of 3 final wealth outcomes. The convex hull
of these 3 outcomes traces out a weakly concave opportunity set.
If we extend this construction to allowing free range betting with any of the bookies, we
obtain a piecewise linear concave opportunity set. Although this construction is Frankenstein-like
for just two bookies, it can obviously be made to approximate a smoother surface with more
bookies. The attractive feature of this construction is that it utilizes the standard experimental frame,
but only differs by allowing subjects to be paid for the bets that they place on all bookies instead of
18 Experimental economists worry a lot about the “contaminating effects” of allowing subjects to
choose a portfolio of lotteries, as discussed by Harrison and Rutström [2008; §2.6] in the context of inferring
risk attitudes. In this instance there are no such difficulties, as long as one considers the complete set of
possible portfolios.
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one picked at random.18
D. Point Beliefs and Belief Distributions
We recover the subjective belief B of an event, but we do not recover the subjective belief
distribution. The belief B is a predictive probability for a specific event, characterizing the subject’s
uncertainty about the event (Roberts [1965], Winkler [2003; §3.7]). But what about his uncertainty
about the probability used to predict this event? The belief B that we recover is consistent with
many supporting belief distributions, and is the mean of those distributions. To see this well-known
result, initially assume that we elicit the belief BA=0.65, and that the subject has degenerate beliefs
with all mass at that point. Under EUT the subject has the following EU for a bet on A occurring
EUA =      BA  × U(payout if A occurs | bet on A) +
         (1-BA) × U(payout if B occurs | bet on A) (2.5)
and the following EU for a bet on B occurring
EUB =      BA × U(payout if A occurs | bet on B) +
        (1-BA) × U(payout if B occurs | bet on B). (2.6)
Now assume that the subject actually had a 2-point distribution with density f(BA1)=½ at 0.60 and
f(BA2)=½ at 0.70. Define EUA1 by substituting BA1 for BA in (2.5), define EUA2 by substituting BA2 for BA
in (2.5), and similarly define EUB1 and EUB2 by corresponding substitutions in (2.6). Then the EU for a
bet on A is now the compound lottery
EUA = [ f(BA1) ×  EUA1 ] + [ f(BA2) ×  EUA2 ] (2.7)
and the EU for a bet on B is similarly defined. Since the outcomes in the conditional lotteries are the
same, one can collect terms and see that (2.7) is identical to 
19 The axiom of EUT that is typically relaxed is the Independence Axiom, and the Reduction of
Compound Lotteries axiom is almost always retained (e.g., Quiggin [1993; p. 19, 134, 154]). It also has
considerable normative appeal in a-temporal settings, such as we have in mind here. However, Segal [1987]
[1990] illustrates some implications of relaxing the Reduction of Compound Lotteries axiom for RDU. To
reiterate, we are focusing solely on probabilistically sophisticated versions of RDU in which the subjective
belief can be recovered.
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:(B)A×U(payout if A occurs | bet on A) + (1-:(BA))×U(payout if B occurs | bet on A) (2.8)
where :(B)A / [ f(BA1) × BA1 ] + [ f(BA2) × BA2 ], the mean of the 2-point distribution. Thus the report
provides us with the mean of the distribution. It is immediate that this result generalizes to
asymmetric distributions with more than 2 mass points, and indeed to continuous distributions.
Thus we can claim, at least under EUT, that we elicit the mean belief. This also means that
we cannot identify the underlying distribution of beliefs, if there is one. The same result generalizes
immediately to RDU if one maintains the Reduction of Compound Lottery axiom, as is standard.19
Of course, in the case of RDU it is the average weighted probability that is elicited, and an additional
step is needed to recover the subjective probability itself.
3.  Experimental Design
Our overall design is to embed the belief elicitation procedure in tasks that allow us to
identify some characteristics of the choice behavior of the subject (their risk attitudes, loss aversion,
and probability weighting), to be trained in the use of the elicitation procedure, and to apply the
procedure to some naturally occurring events. We pair the belief elicitation task with another task
that allows us to identify attitudes to risk, loss aversion and probability weighting from the sample,
since we are jointly eliciting these and beliefs.
A. Characterizing Attitudes to Lotteries
The first series of tasks are designed to tell us if the subject is better characterized as
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following expected utility theory or prospect theory, and then to identify the specific attitudes to risk
or losses that the subject has. This will be useful when we evaluate performance in the elicitation
task, as explained later. For this purpose we use a series of binary choice tasks patterned after Hey
and Orme [1992], but with the “mixed frame” implementation of Harrison and Rutström [2005].
Each lottery consisted of 2 or more monetary prizes consisting of $8, $3, $0, -$3 or -$8, with varying
probabilities. Each subject received an endowment at the start of the task to cover any losses. There
were 60 choices, and three were to be chosen at random for payment, so the endowment was $24.
Hence, if the subject ended up losing $8 three times, net earnings from these choices would be $0.
Some lotteries consisted of non-negative prizes, some of non-positive prizes, but most had a
mixture of positive and negative prizes. The screen shot displayed above illustrates a typical choice
task. Appendix B shows the instructions provided to subjects, who also had a practice session of 6
hypothetical choices.
These choices allow one to estimate a parametric model of behavior that allows expected
utility theory (EUT) or prospect theory (PT) to explain behavior. Conditional on the choices being
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generated by EUT we estimate a coefficient of relative risk aversion. Conditional on the choices
being generated by PT we estimate risk aversion coefficients for gains and losses, a loss aversion
coefficient, and a coefficient reflecting the extent of probability weighting.
B. Belief Elicitation With Odds
The second task is the elicitation task trainer. We use a simple event that can be resolved in
the laboratory to train subjects on the procedure. The instructions are presented in written form, and
read out aloud; they are provided in full in Appendix B. Rewards for the trainer are hypothetical, but
our experience is that a hands-on trainer typically provides more information than only providing
written instructions.
The third task is the elicitation task of interest. We use a naturally occurring event as the
object of the elicitation, such as a football game. This event was one that was to be resolved in the
future. The basic task is illustrated in the screen shot shown above, which is one of the actual tasks
given to subjects. The event is whether Brazil will win the 2006 World Cup. There are 9 betting
houses offering different odds that Brazil would win. Prior to this interface the subject is provided
information on 3 betting houses that offer odds on events ranging from the winner of the U.S.
Presidential race in 2008, the winner of the American Idol television show in 2006, an Australian Rules
football match, and a soccer match between the USA and Morocco. The laboratory interface was
-30-
patterned after the field interface used by the New Zealand Totalisater Agency Board (NZ TAB)
shown above, so that the subjects would realize that there are numerous field referents to the
interface we were providing. The example used in the instructions was actually the USA v. Morocco
soccer match referenced in the NZ TAB screen shot, to help subjects see how our lab interface
corresponded to the field interface actually used.
The use of 4 field bets from 3 betting houses also served to show the subjects that there are
many betting houses available, offering different odds for the same event. To reinforce the fact that
different betting houses in the field might offer different odds for the same outcome, we also
provided subjects with a screen shot from a web site that simply collects these. This display is shown
above, and used the winner of the 2006 U.S. National Basketball Association championship as the
20 An alternative “free range” design also allows the subject to vary the stake that is bet in each house,
from $0 up to $10 in $1 increments, and is discussed in §5 as an important extension that builds a bridge
between our elicitation task and those found in open prediction markets.
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exemplar. Odds for the top 3 teams are displayed from 14 active betting houses, and the range of
odds for the same team pointed out to subjects.
Our instructions are deliberate in using these graphics to provide subjects with field referents
to the nature of the task, without of course providing information on prevailing market odds for any
of the bets that were to be used to reward subjects. Harrison and List [2004] argue that there are
many features of field experiments compared to conventional lab experiments, and that the use of
field referents in instructions is one component, among many, that might encourage subject
behavior in an experiment that is closer to naturally-occurring behavior.
Returning to our lab interface, the subject is given a $10 stake with which to bet in each
betting house. The $10 from one house is not transferable to other houses, and one of the bets will
be selected to be actually played out (selected using a die that the subject throws). We “force fed”
the subjects by requiring that they place a bet with each house, and did not allow them to change the
$10 stakes: all the subject can do is decide if they want to bet on event A or event B in each house.20
The interface updated the display showing net winnings conditional on each event occurring,
as illustrated below. This illustration shows a subject that was willing to bet on Brazil winning when
the odds being quoted were favorable enough, but who switches to betting on Brazil not winning
between odds of $3.33 to $1.43 and $2.50 to $1.67. This switch point corresponds to house
probabilities of Brazil winning between 0.3 and 0.4, which are also displayed to the subjects. The
subject is told in the instructions that their net winnings are “net” of the stake that we gave them to
bet with.
The actual elicitation tasks involved a hypothetical trainer, one fact which could be resolved
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during the session, and three natural events occurring in the future. The hypothetical trainer was
whether Mercury was the closest planet to the sun. This question was chosen since there is some
survey evidence that U.S. college seniors do not universally know that this is true, and it can be
verified with no time delay. Thus subjects could see the effect of their choices when compared to an
actual outcome. The fact used for real rewards was either whether Madrid was the capital of
Portugal. The natural events used for real rewards were (i) whether Brazil would win the 2006 World
Cup outright, (ii) whether Donald Rumsfeld would resign by the end of 2006, and (iii) whether Tiger
Woods would win the 2006 U.S. Golf Championship.  The outcome of the two sporting events were
to be known in late June and early July, and subjects were to be paid mid-July. The political event
was to be known by the end of 2006, and subjects were to be paid at the beginning of 2007.
For simplicity we assume that the risk attitudes we elicit using lotteries defined over
contemporaneous payouts can be used to recover the subjective beliefs inherent in bets defined over
future payouts. In effect, we assume that risk attitudes “today” apply “in the future.” In principle
one could elicit risk attitudes applicable to future payouts, and there are good reasons to eventually
21 One reason is that risk attitudes could be state-dependent, and subjects might expect some changes
in some state in the future. Methods for eliciting state-dependent preferences are evaluated in Andersen et al.
[2008]. Another reason is that “dual-self” models of decision making under risk posit differences in the
preferences that are brought to bear when making choices over money today and money in the future: see
Fudenberg and Levine [2006] for a theoretical exposition and Andersen et al. [2005] for an empirical
application to eliciting preferences. Finally, there is the possibility that preferences over bets might depend on
the timing of the resolution of the event, as proposed by Kreps and Porteus [1978].
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do that; nonetheless, we avoid procedural complexity by making this assumption.21
We recruited 25 subjects from the general student population of the University of Central
Florida. Subjects were recruited for this specific experiment using the computerized ExLab interface
(http://exlab.bus.ucf.edu), after being solicited in general terms to register with Exlab for paid
experiments. All subjects received a $5 show-up fee, and participated in the same session. Apart
from the choice tasks described above, all subjects completed a survey of demographic
characteristics. Payments for the belief elicitation task totaled $1,094, and all deferred payments were
cashed.
4. Results
We present the results of our experiments in three stages. First, we examine the raw
responses to our belief elicitation task, which can be interpreted directly as elicited beliefs under the
assumption that subjects are risk neutral. Second, we specify the estimation framework and define a
joint likelihood over the responses to the lottery tasks and the belief tasks, allowing us to generate
maximum likelihood estimates of all parameters. We specify one framework assuming EUT, and one
framework assuming RDU. Third, we examine the evidence for the strong assumption of risk
neutrality – it will not come as a shock if we reject it. Fourth, we show how inferences about beliefs
are adjusted or calibrated for the “distortions” generated by deviations from the risk-neutrality
assumption.
22 The term “consistently” anticipates the possibility that subjects might make errors, as formally
allowed for in our econometric framework.
23 As it happens, two subjects did switch their bets as the odds varied, but almost perfectly offset
each other in terms of the direction of their switches.
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A. Elicited Beliefs from the Raw Data
The raw data from our belief elicitation task can be represented in terms of the fraction of
subjects that picked option A at each given house probability. To understand the nature of the
choices at the individual level, Figure 12 displays a binary indicator of the bets of the first 4 subjects.
A value of 1 on the vertical axis indicates that the subject bet on the event or state occurring, and a
value of 0 indicates otherwise. Thus subject #6001 was certain that Rumsfeld would resign, and
would not bet against this outcome no matter what odds were offered. The next three subjects were
less certain. If we assume that subjects behave consistently22 and are risk neutral, we can infer
subjective beliefs from these choices: subject #6001 has a degenerate probability of 1, subject #6002
has a belief in the interval [0.5, 0.6], subject #6003 has a belief in the interval [0.4, 0.5], and subject
#6004 has a belief in the interval [0.3, 0.4].
Figure 13 displays comparable data pooled over all subjects. These lines represent the
average over all subjects, so the 1 and 0 values on the vertical axes represent the same outcome as
the binary indicator in Figure 12. But as we pool over subjects we have averages that are between 0
and 1, of course. Hence the panel for Rumsfeld Resigning in Figure 13 is generated by taking
averages over the panels illustrated in Figure 12, although for all 25 subjects.
From Figure 13 we observe that this sample is virtually certain that Madrid is not the capital
of Portugal, which is re-assuring.23 A majority of subjects held subjective beliefs that Rumsfeld
would resign with probability 0.4 or less, that Tiger would win the next U.S. Open with probability
0.4, and that Brazil would win the World Cup with probability 0.5.
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B. Joint Estimates of Beliefs and Preferences Towards Risk
Expected Utility Theory
We assume a CRRA utility function defined over the gain domain of lottery prizes y as
U(y) = (y1!r)/(1!r) (4.1)
where r  is the CRRA coefficient and y$0. With this specification, and for y$0, r = 0 denotes risk
neutral behavior, r > 0 denotes risk aversion, and r < 0 denotes risk loving. All arguments of utility
are defined as the gross earnings from each bet, as defined in Table 1, so they are non-negative.
The utility function (4.1) can be estimated using maximum likelihood and a latent structural
model of choice, such as EUT. Let there be K possible outcomes in a lottery; in our lottery choice
task K#4. Under EUT the probabilities for each outcome k in the lottery choice task, pk, are those
that are induced by the experimenter, so expected utility is simply the probability weighted utility of
each outcome in each lottery i:
EUi = 3k=1,K [ pk × uk ]. (4.2)
The EU for each lottery pair is calculated for a candidate estimate of r, and the index
LEU = EUR - EUL (4.3)
calculated, where EUL is the “left” lottery and EUR is the “right” lottery. This latent index, based on
latent preferences, is then linked to the observed choices using a standard cumulative normal
distribution function M(LEU). This “probit” function takes any argument between ±4 and
transforms it into a number between 0 and 1. Thus we have the probit link function,
prob(choose lottery R) = M(LEU) (4.4)
The latent index defined by (4.3) is linked to the observed choices by specifying that the R lottery is
chosen when LEU > ½, which is implied by (4.4).
Thus the likelihood of the observed responses, conditional on the EUT and CRRA
specifications being true, depends on the estimates of r given the above statistical specification and
24 Our treatment of indifferent responses uses the specification developed by Papke and Wooldridge
[1996; equation 5, p.621] for fractional dependant variables. Alternatively, one could follow Hey and Orme
[1994; p.1302] and introduce a new parameter J to capture the idea that certain subjects state indifference
when the latent index showing how much they prefer one lottery over another falls below some threshold J in
absolute value. This is a natural assumption to make, particularly for the experiments they ran in which the
subjects were told that expressions of indifference would be resolved by the experimenter, but not told how
the experimenter would do that (p.1295, footnote 4). It adds one more parameter to estimate, but for good
cause.
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the observed choices. If we ignore responses that reflect indifference, for the moment, the log-
likelihood is then
ln L(r; y, X)  = 3i [ (ln M(LEU) * yi = 1) + (ln M(1!LEU) * yi = !1) ] (4.5)
where yi =1(!1) denotes the choice of the Option R (L) lottery in lottery task i, and X is a vector of
individual characteristics reflecting age, sex, race, and so on. When we pool responses over subjects
the X vector will play an important role to allow for some heterogeneity of preferences.
In our lottery experiments the subjects are told at the outset that any expression of
indifference would mean that the experimenter would toss a fair coin to make the decision for them
if that choice was selected to be played out. Hence one can modify the likelihood to take these
responses into account by recognizing that such choices implied a 50:50 mixture of the likelihood of
choosing either lottery:
ln L(r; y, X)  = 3i [ (ln M(LEU) * yi = 1) + (ln M(1!LEU) * yi = !1) +
(ln (½ M(LEU) + ½ M(1!LEU)) * yi = 0) ] (4.5')
where yi =0 denotes the choice of indifference. In our experience very few subjects choose the
indifference option, but this formal statistical extension accommodates those responses.24
To allow for subject heterogeneity with respect to risk attitudes, the parameter r is modeled
as a linear function of observed individual characteristics of the subject. For example, assume that
we only had information on the age and sex of the subject, denoted Age (in years) and Female (0 for
males, and 1 for females). Then we would estimate the coefficients ", $ and 0 in r = " + $ ×Age + 
25 This assumption is clear in the use of a link function between the latent index LEU and the
probability of picking one or other lottery; in the case of the normal CDF, this link function is M(LEU). If the
subject exhibited no errors from the perspective of EUT, this function would be a step function: zero for all
values of LEU<0, anywhere between 0 and 1 for LEU=0, and 1 for all values of LEU>0. 
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0 × Female. Therefore, each subject would have a different estimated r, r$, for a given set of
estimates of ", $ and 0 to the extent that the subject had distinct individual characteristics. So if
there were two subjects with the same sex and age, to use the above example, they would literally
have the same r$, but if they differed in sex and/or age they would generally have distinct r$. In fact,
we use 8 individual characteristics in our model. Apart from age and sex, these include binary
indicators for subjects that self-declare their ethnicity as Asian, declare themselves to be Hispanic, a
Business major, a U.S. Citizen, a Graduate student, and having a low GPA (below 3.25). Age is
measured as years in excess of 19, so it shows the effect of age increments.
An important extension of the core model is to allow for subjects to make some errors. The
notion of error is one that has already been encountered in the form of the statistical assumption
(4.4) that the probability of choosing a lottery is not 1 when the EU of that lottery exceeds the EU
of the other lottery.25 By varying the shape of the link function implicit in (4.4), one can informally
imagine subjects that are more sensitive to a given difference in the index LEU and subjects that are
not so sensitive. We use the error specification originally due to Fechner [1860], and popularized by
Becker, DeGroot and Marschak [1963] and Hey and Orme [1994]. It posits the latent index
LEU = (EUR - EUL)/: (4.3N)
instead of (4.3), where :>0 is a structural “noise parameter” used to allow some errors from the
perspective of the deterministic EUT model. As : 6 4 this specification collapses LEU to 0, so the
probability of either choice converges to ½. So a larger : means that the difference in the EU of the
two lotteries, conditional on the estimate of r, has less predictive effect on choices. Thus : can be
viewed as a parameter that flattens out, or “sharpens,” the link functions implicit in (4.4). This is just
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one of several different types of error story that could be used, and Wilcox [2008] provides a
masterful review of the implications of the strengths and weaknesses of the major alternatives.
Thus we extend the likelihood specification to include the noise parameter :,
ln L(r, :; y, X)  = 3i [ (ln M(LEU) * yi = 1) + (ln M(1!LEU) * yi = !1) +
(ln (½ M(LEU) + ½ M(1!LEU)) * yi = 0) ] (4.5O)
and estimate r and : using maximum likelihood, given observations on y and X. Additional details
of the estimation methods used, including corrections for “clustered” errors when we pool choices
over subjects and tasks, is provided by Harrison and Rutström [2008].
Rank Dependent Utility
The RDU model extends the EUT model by allowing for decision weights on lottery
outcomes. Instead of (4.1) we have
U(y) = (y1!D)/(1!D) (4.6)
for y$0, and where D  is the coefficient for the curvature of the utility function. To calculate decision
weights under RDU one replaces expected utility defined by (4.2) with RDU
RDUi = 3k=1, K [ wk × uk ] (4.7)
where
wi = T(pi + ... + pn) - T(pi+1 + ... + pn) (4.8a)
for i=1,... , n-1, and
wi = T(pi) (4.8b)
for i=n, the subscript indicating outcomes ranked from worst to best, and where T(p) is some
probability weighting function. We adopt the popular probability weighting function employed by
Tversky and Kahneman [1992], with curvature parameter (. It is assumed to have well-behaved
endpoints such that T(0)=0 and T(1)=1 and to imply weights
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T(p) = p(/[ p( + (1-p)( ]1/( (4.9)
for 0<p<1. So (<1 implies the usual inverse-S shaped function, but (>1 has been observed in
some studies. 
The same Fechner noise specification is used as in the EUT model, and defined over the
difference in the RDU calculated from (4.7):
LRDU = (RDUR - RDUL)/: (4.10)
The likelihood specification for the RDU model is therefore 
ln L(D, (, :; y, X)  = 3i [ (ln M(LRDU) * yi = 1) + (ln M(1!LRDU) * yi = !1) +
(ln (½ M(LRDU) + ½ M(1!LRDU)) * yi = 0) ] (4.11)
and entails the estimate of D, ( and : using maximum likelihood. Individual heterogeneity is allowed
for by estimating the parameters D and ( as linear functions of the 8 demographic characteristics
defined earlier.
Figure 14 shows the manner in which the parameter ( characterizes the probability
weighting function and the decisions weights used to evaluate lottery choices. Since we assume
(=0.7<1 in this illustration, the probability weighting function T(p) has the standard inverse-S
shaped form. For simplicity here we assume lotteries with 2, 3 or 4 prizes that are equally likely when
we generate the decision weights. So for the case of 2 prizes, each prize has p=½; with 3 prizes, each
prize has p=a; and with 4 prizes, each prize has p=¼. For the 3-prize and 4-prize lottery we see the
standard result, that the decision weights on the extreme prizes are relatively greater than the true
probability, and the decision weights on the interior prizes are relatively smaller than the true
probability. For (>1 the interior-ranked prizes receive greater decision weight.
Each panel in Figure 14 is important for our analysis. For the purposes of estimating ( from
the observed lottery choices we only need the decision weights in the right panel of Figure 14. But
for the purposes of recovering subjective beliefs subject to probability weighting, we only need the
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probability weighting function. In fact, we need it’s inverse function, since it is the p in the T(p)
function that we are seeking to recover. We do not directly observe T(p), but we can estimate it as
part of the latent structure generating the observed choices in the belief task. Once we have T(p) we
can then recover p by directly applying the estimated probability weighting function shown, for a
typical (, in the left panel of Figure 14.
C. Elicited Beliefs of the Sample after Correcting for Preferences Towards Risk
The responses to the belief elicitation task can be used to draw estimates about the belief
that each subject holds if we are willing to assume something about how they make decisions under
risk.
If they are assumed to be risk neutral, then we can directly infer intervals that contain that
point estimate, as our discussion of Figure 12 illustrated. If we do that for all subjects and all tasks,
we obtain interval estimates that can then be used to make inferences about beliefs using interval
regression methods. Figure 15 displays the risk neutral estimates that we obtain in this manner from
the pooled data, after controlling for observable demographics. We infer that the sample holds
beliefs that Rumsfeld will resign of 0.54, that Tiger will win of 0.50, and that Brazil will win of 0.46.
There is also considerable diversity in beliefs, with standard deviations of 0.13, 0.09 and 0.14,
respectively.
Moving to the models that allow for varying risk attitudes, we jointly estimate the subjective
probability and the parameters of the core model. Using the schema in Table 1, the subject that
selects event A from a given bookie b receives EU
EUA =      BA  × U(payout if A occurs | bet on A) +
         (1-BA) × U(payout if B occurs | bet on A) (4.12)
where BA is the subjective probability that A will occur; this is the same expression introduced earlier
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as (2.5). The payouts that enter the utility function are defined by the odds that each bookie offers,
and are illustrated in Table 1. For the bet offered by the first bookie, for example, these payouts are
$10 and $0, so we have
EUA = BA × U($10) + (1-BA) × U($0) (4.12N)
 We similarly define the EU received from a bet on event B, restating (2.6), as the complement of
event A:
EUB =      BA × U(payout if A occurs | bet on B) +
        (1-BA) × U(payout if B occurs | bet on B). (4.13)
and this translates for the first bookie in Table 1 into payouts of $0 and $1.11, so we have
EUB = BA × U($0) + (1-BA) × U($1.11) (4.13N)
for this particular bookie and bet. We observe the bet made by the subject, so we can calculate the
likelihood of that choice given values of r, BA and :.
We need r to evaluate the utility function in (4.12) and (4.13), we need BA to calculate the EU
in (4.12) and (4.13) once we know the utility values, and we need : to calculate the latent indices
(4.3N) or (4.10) that generate the probability of observing the choice of event A or event B when we
allow for some noise in that process. The joint maximum likelihood problem is to find the values of
these parameters that best explain observed choices in the belief elicitation tasks as well as observed
choices in the lottery tasks. In effect, the lottery task allow us to identify r under EUT, and D and (
under RDU, since BA plays no direct role in explaining the choices in that task. Individual
heterogeneity is allowed for by estimating the B parameters, one for each belief task, as linear
functions of the demographic characteristics defined earlier.
Table 3 and 4 collect the detailed estimates for each model, and Figure 16 displays densities
of the predicted parameter estimates across individuals. These estimates serve as a reminder that the
heterogeneity in beliefs here derives from variations in demographic characteristics across
26 The log-likelihood for the RDU model is lower than the log-likelihood for the EUT model, as one
would expect since the EUT model is nested in the RDU model. However, we do not view this as a legitimate
basis for declaring RDU to be the sole “true” model to describe behavior of this sample. In general we need
to allow for behavior to be explained by a mixture of such latent data-generating processes, and the evidence
suggests that such mixtures apply even when the aggregate log-likelihood of one model dominates the other
(Harrison and Rutström [2005]).
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individuals in the sample. This variation is reflected not just in the estimates of the beliefs
themselves, but in the estimates of the core parameters r, D and (, which in turn affect the estimates
of the beliefs indirectly. Figure 16 shows that the estimates of the curvature of the utility function
under EUT and RDU each suggest a predominance of risk loving behavior (r<0 and D<0), with a
mode at risk neutrality. In general the probability weighting parameter ( indicates the conventional
inverse-S shaped probability weighting ((<1), although there is a smaller mode corresponding to
subjects that exhibit S-shaped probability weighting.26
Since the focus of the estimation is on the subjective probability, it is important to ensure
that the estimates of B lie in the closed interval [0,1]. It is straightforward to constrain the estimates
to the open unit interval, which is sufficient for our purposes, by estimating the log odds transform
6 of the parameters we are really interested in, and converting using 6 = 1/(1+eB). This transform is
one of several used by statisticians; for example, see Rabe-Hesketh and Everitt [2004; p. 244]. These
commands use the Delta Method from statistics to calculate the standard errors correctly: see
Oehlert [1992] for an exposition and historical note.
Figures 17, 18 and 19 show the effect of jointly estimating subjective beliefs conditional on a
specific model of choice under uncertainty other than risk neutrality. The solid density in each panel
is the baseline distribution assuming risk neutrality, for reference; these just repeat, for each task, the
corresponding density from Figure 15. In the left panel we see the effect of calibrating subjective
beliefs using an EUT model that allows for risk attitudes, and in the right panel we see the effect of
calibrating subjective beliefs using an RDU model that allows for utility curvature and probability
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weighting.
Consider Figure 17, and beliefs about the resignation of Rumsfeld. The effect of the “salvage
operation” is to recover a distribution of subjective beliefs that is strikingly different than the one
implied by assuming that subjects are risk neutral. Figures 18 and 19 show the estimated densities for
the belief about whether Tiger will win, and that Brazil will win. The same qualitative pattern
emerges.
D. Why are the Recovered Beliefs so Fragile?
The pattern of adjustment is relatively easy to account for given the evidence of risk loving
behavior. Figure 20 shows the difference between the true belief and the reported switch point of a
risk averse CRRA agent with r=0.57, the example used in §2, as well as a risk loving CRRA agent
with r= -0.57. For each type of agent we show the switch points, in terms of house probabilities, at
which the agent changes from betting on A to betting on B. The paradigm here is our forced feed
environment, in which the agent faces bookies at each house probability and has to bet a given stake
all on A or all on B. Thus it corresponds to the experimental frame we used, and Figure 11. The risk
neutral agent switches at house probabilities equal to her true belief.
In panel A of Figure 20 we see that the risk averse agent, however, switches at lower
probabilities when true beliefs are below ½, and switches at higher probabilities when true beliefs
are above ½. Thus the risk averse agent will appear to be more certain, when incorrectly interpreted under the
assumption of risk neutrality, than she really is. The risk loving agent in panel B of Figure 20 exhibits the
reverse qualitative behavior: he switches at house probabilities greater than his true beliefs when
those true beliefs are less than ½, and switches at house probabilities less than his true beliefs
otherwise. Thus the risk loving agent will appear to be less certain, from a risk neutral interpretation of observed
switching behavior, than he really is.
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Figure 21 uses the risk averse agent to show the extent of the salvage operation involved in
recovering true beliefs. For an agent with a true belief of ¾, we would see a switch at a house
probability of 0.93 if bookies with house probabilities incremented in 0.01 amounts were available.
Thus the error from interpreting her behavior as being generated by a risk neutral response would be
18 percentage points, as shown. 
Figure 22 provides a warning about the difficulty of the salvage operation involved in
inferring true beliefs from observed behavior, and another hint as to why inferences about subjective
beliefs might be fragile. The same point was made less formally in §1D, couched there in terms of
the “observational equivalence” of a range of subjective beliefs. If we only have house probabilities
incremented in 0.1 amounts, as in our experiments, we would not be able to differentiate observationally
beliefs in the heavily shaded region to the right of panels A and B in Figure 22, as marked by the
arrow. In panel A, with a risk averse agent, every such belief, from 0.73 up to 1, would result in the
agent choosing A for all house probabilities. This result does not depend on the agent picking all A
or all B, as panel B illustrates. Here we depict, in the heavily shaded region, the range of true beliefs
consistent with the agent picking A for all house probabilities up to and including 0.7, and then
picking B. This range is between 0.64 up to 0.72.
Of course, if we are uncertain about the CRRA (and probability weighting) coefficient for
this agent, these ranges would be even wider. And they are, as strikingly demonstrated in Figures 16,
17 and 18.
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5. Conclusions
Our approach brings together theoretical tools, experimental procedures, and econometric
techniques that allow us to elicit subjective beliefs. The theoretical tools are based on many ideas
found in the literature, and show that scoring rule procedures and betting procedures can be viewed
from the same formal perspective: they both set up a game of exchange between two parties,
defined over state-contingent wealth claims. This perspective allows one to see how this game can
be applied in experiments, and also how the game itself can be modified to encourage truthful and
natural decisions. But the most important insight is that we can directly apply alternative models of
decision making under risk to recover subjective beliefs in a rigorous manner. We show that those
corrections can be substantial, depending on the model of decision making adopted.
One theme of our results is that inferences about subjective beliefs are fragile. One cannot
simply read off the subjective beliefs of an individual from some intelligently designed task. The
subjects often find these tasks artefactual, and it is only blind faith that leads one to believe that they
perceive or believe the dominant strategy of making a truthful response. Moreover, that strategy is
often not a dominant strategy when subjects are risk averse or risk loving, so the claim itself is often
simply irrelevant to subjects. In fact, the subjects do still respond truthfully, but they also take into
account the risk consequences of the decisions they are being asked to make. The challenge is for
the observer to recover the subjective beliefs embedded in those decisions.
The complementary, and constructive, theme of our results is that we do have the tools to
elicit subjective beliefs, if we are prepared to make enough structural assumptions. The structural
assumptions we use are stronger than those that are necessary, but our objective was to demonstrate
the range of assumptions necessary and to adopt popular functional forms. To recover subjective
beliefs we need to know the risk attitudes of individuals, and we can define risk attitudes in terms of
several popular models. We used EUT and RDU, but the approach extends to Prospect Theory,
27 A related issue is allowing subjects to bet with their own money, earned in some prior task, rather
than with house money. 
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Regret Theory, and the myriad variants in the literature. We prefer to recover latent subjective beliefs
using explicit structural models, so we know what forces are causing the subject to deviate from the
choices implied by a risk neutral agent. If we are going to claim that subject #6003, from Figure 12,
has some belief that Rumsfeld will resign that is not  between 0.4 and 0.5, we want to be able to tell a
sensible story to justify the claim.
Three extensions merit mention, with a longer list in Appendix C. One is to allow subjects to
engage in “free range” betting, in which they can decide to hold back some of their stake and not
place a bet. This option connects our approach to the beliefs elicited on open prediction markets,
where subjects are not forced to place a bet.27 Free range betting also allows a more precise joint
determination of latent risk attitudes and subjective beliefs. A second extension would be to allow
subjects to place (free range) bets on all bookies and be paid for all bets, so that they optimize with
respect to the portfolio available to them. This would concavify the opportunity set, as explained in
§2C, and should result in significantly less fragile statistical inferences about beliefs. A third
extension is to compare our results to experimental frames that present traditional scoring rules,
such as the QSR, to see the effect of our “natural betting” frame compared to the complicated
scoring rules that have been popular.
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Table 1: Betting Choices Facing Subject Forced to Place a Bet
Assume subject has a personal belief that A will occur with probability ¾.
House
Probabilities Odds Net Earnings Gross Earnings
Stake
A B A B to Bet Bet on A Bet on B A wins B wins
Expected
from bets A wins B wins
Expected
from bets
0.1 0.9 $10.00 $1.11 $1.00 1 0 $9.00 $-1.00 $6.50 $10.00 $0.00 $7.50
0.2 0.8 $5.00 $1.25 $1.00 1 0 $4.00 $-1.00 $2.75 $5.00 $0.00 $3.75
0.3 0.7 $3.33 $1.43 $1.00 1 0 $2.33 $-1.00 $1.50 $3.33 $0.00 $2.50
0.4 0.6 $2.50 $1.67 $1.00 1 0 $1.50 $-1.00 $0.88 $2.50 $0.00 $1.88
0.5 0.5 $2.00 $2.00 $1.00 1 0 $1.00 $-1.00 $0.50 $2.00 $0.00 $1.50
0.6 0.4 $1.67 $2.50 $1.00 1 0 $0.67 $-1.00 $0.25 $1.67 $0.00 $1.25
0.7 0.3 $1.43 $3.33 $1.00 1 0 $0.43 $-1.00 $0.07 $1.43 $0.00 $1.07
0.8 0.2 $1.25 $5.00 $1.00 0 1 $-1.00 $4.00 $0.25 $0.00 $5.00 $1.25
0.9 0.1 $1.11 $10.00 $1.00 0 1 $-1.00 $9.00 $1.50 $0.00 $10.00 $2.50
$14.20 $23.20
-48-
Figure 1: Certainty Equivalents of Optimal Bets Across Betting Houses
A. Risk Neutral agent with subjective belief = ¾ 
B. Risk averse agent with subjective belief = ¾ 
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Figure 11: Opportunity Sets for Experimental Design
A. Risk Neutral agent with subjective belief = 0.65, facing one bookie
B. Risk neutral and risk averse agents facing multiple bookies
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Table 2: Maximum Likelihood Estimates of Risk Neutral Subjective Beliefs
Interval regression estimates of elicited probability. N=25 subjects.
Lower 95% Upper 95%
Standard Confidence Confidence
Variable Description Estimate Error p-value Interval Interval
A. Rumsfeld to Resign
Constant -0.10 0.18 0.59 -0.46  0.26
female Female -0.08 0.09 0.37 -0.24  0.09
Asian Asian heritage  0.06 0.11 0.55 -0.15  0.27
Hispanic Hispanic heritage  0.00 0.10 0.97 -0.21  0.20
Citizen US citizen  0.45 0.15 0.00  0.16  0.74
Age Years in age over 17  0.03 0.01 0.03  0.00  0.05
Business Business -0.21 0.09 0.01 -0.38 -0.04
Graduate Graduate Student  0.33 0.12 0.01  0.09  0.56
GPAlow GPA score lower than 3.24  0.33 0.10 0.00  0.14  0.52
B. Tiger To Win
Constant  0.53 0.23 0.02  0.08  0.99
female Female  0.07 0.11 0.54 -0.15  0.28
Asian Asian heritage -0.24 0.14 0.08 -0.50  0.03
Hispanic Hispanic heritage -0.21 0.13 0.11 -0.46  0.05
Citizen US citizen  0.02 0.19 0.93 -0.35  0.38
Age Years in age over 17  0.01 0.01 0.26 -0.01  0.04
Business Business -0.22 0.11 0.04 -0.44 -0.01
Graduate Graduate Student -0.04 0.15 0.79 -0.33  0.25
GPAlow GPA score lower than 3.24  0.13 0.12 0.26 -0.10  0.36
C. Brazil To Win
Constant  0.62 0.16 0.00  0.31  0.94
female Female  0.09 0.08 0.22 -0.06  0.24
Asian Asian heritage -0.17 0.10 0.08 -0.37  0.02
Hispanic Hispanic heritage -0.20 0.09 0.02 -0.37 -0.03
Citizen US citizen  0.01 0.13 0.92 -0.24  0.26
Age Years in age over 17  0.01 0.01 0.38 -0.01  0.02
Business Business -0.32 0.08 0.00 -0.48 -0.17
Graduate Graduate Student  0.12 0.10 0.22 -0.07  0.31
GPAlow GPA score lower than 3.24 -0.03 0.08 0.71 -0.19  0.13
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Figure 16: Distribution of Estimated EUT and RDU Parameters
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Figure 17: Effect of Calibration on Elicited Belief
that Rumsfeld Will Resign
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Figure 18: Effect of Calibration on Elicited Belief
that Tiger Will Win
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Figure 19: Effect of Calibration on Elicited Belief
that Brazil Will Win
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Table 3: Maximum Likelihood Estimates of EUT Subjective Beliefs
Lower 95% Upper 95%
Standard Confidence Confidence
Variable Description Estimate Error p-value Interval Interval
r
Constant -0.59 0.63 0.36 -1.85  0.68
female Female  0.09 0.19 0.65 -0.29  0.47
Asian Asian heritage  0.54 0.28 0.05 -0.01  1.09
Hispanic Hispanic heritage -0.74 0.22 0.00 -1.18 -0.30
Citizen US citizen  0.24 0.48 0.61 -0.72  1.20
Age Years in age over 17  0.10 0.01 0.00  0.07  0.13
Business Business -0.93 0.17 0.00 -1.27 -0.59
Graduate Graduate Student  0.14 0.33 0.67 -0.51  0.79
GPAlow GPA score lower than 3.24 -0.01 0.16 0.94 -0.33  0.30
: Fechner Error 34.58  18.45 0.07 -2.18 71.34
6R
Constant  4.72 1.40 0.00  1.93  7.51
female Female  0.34 0.56 0.55 -0.78  1.45
Asian Asian heritage -0.71 0.59 0.24 -1.89  0.48
Hispanic Hispanic heritage -0.96 1.97 0.63 -4.88  2.97
Citizen US citizen -2.20 1.51 0.15 -5.20  0.80
Age Years in age over 17 -0.36 0.12 0.00 -0.59 -0.13
Business Business  2.82 1.67 0.10 -0.51  6.15
Graduate Graduate Student -3.87 1.12 0.00 -6.10 -1.64
GPAlow GPA score lower than 3.24 -3.91 0.90 0.00 -5.70 -2.12
6R
Constant  2.12 1.16 0.07 -0.19  4.42
female Female -1.92 0.61 0.00 -3.13 -0.71
Asian Asian heritage  3.56 0.84 0.00  1.89  5.22
Hispanic Hispanic heritage -1.02 0.72 0.16 -2.45  0.40
Citizen US citizen -1.07 0.92 0.25 -2.91  0.76
Age Years in age over 17  0.69 0.29 0.02  0.10  1.27
Business Business  1.43 0.72 0.05  0.00  2.87
Graduate Graduate Student -2.52 0.62 0.00 -3.76 -1.29
GPAlow GPA score lower than 3.24 -4.47 0.65 0.00 -5.76 -3.18
6R
Constant -1.15 0.78 0.15 -2.69  0.40
female Female -1.75 0.57 0.00 -2.88 -0.62
Asian Asian heritage 6.10 1.15 0.00 3.81  8.40
Hispanic Hispanic heritage -0.59 1.47 0.69 -3.53  2.34
Citizen US citizen 0.94 1.42 0.51 -1.89  3.77
Age Years in age over 17 1.24 0.27 0.00 0.70  1.77
Business Business 0.47 1.36 0.73 -2.24  3.17
Graduate Graduate Student -2.13 1.32 0.11 -4.77  0.51
GPAlow GPA score lower than 3.24 -2.85 0.81 0.00 -4.46 -1.24
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Table 4: Maximum Likelihood Estimates of RDEU Subjective Beliefs
Lower 95% Upper 95%
Standard Confidence Confidence
Variable Description Estimate Error p-value Interval Interval
r
Constant  0.17 0.64 0.79 -1.10  1.44
female Female -0.24 0.17 0.17 -0.58  0.10
Asian Asian heritage  0.42 0.28 0.13 -0.13  0.97
Hispanic Hispanic heritage -0.92 0.17 0.00 -1.26 -0.58
Citizen US citizen -0.34 0.50 0.50 -1.34  0.66
Age Years in age over 17  0.10 0.01 0.00  0.08  0.13
Business Business -1.26 0.23 0.00 -1.72 -0.79
Graduate Graduate Student -0.20 0.22 0.35 -0.64  0.23
GPAlow GPA score lower than 3.24 -0.01 0.14 0.92 -0.30  0.27
(
Constant  0.67 0.30 0.03  0.09  1.26
female Female  1.26 0.48 0.01  0.30  2.23
Asian Asian heritage -0.19 0.09 0.04 -0.37 -0.01
Hispanic Hispanic heritage  0.15 0.12 0.23 -0.09  0.39
Citizen US citizen  0.05 0.26 0.85 -0.47  0.57
Age Years in age over 17 -0.01 0.02 0.42 -0.05  0.02
Business Business  0.27 0.11 0.02  0.05  0.49
Graduate Graduate Student -0.29 0.18 0.11 -0.63  0.06
GPAlow GPA score lower than 3.24 -0.02 0.21 0.91 -0.45  0.40
: Fechner Error 50.49 32.46 0.12 -14.17 115.14
6R
Constant -14.53 9.93 0.15 -34.30  5.25
female Female  0.27 0.31 0.39 -0.34  0.88
Asian Asian heritage -0.32 0.45 0.48 -1.22  0.57
Hispanic Hispanic heritage  0.71 0.99 0.48 -1.27  2.69
Citizen US citizen 15.63 9.94 0.12 -4.17 35.44
Age Years in age over 17 -0.57 0.17 0.00 -0.90 -0.23
Business Business  7.44 2.42 0.00  2.62 12.25
Graduate Graduate Student -6.47 2.37 0.01 -11.18 -1.75
GPAlow GPA score lower than 3.24 -6.77 2.34 0.01 -11.44 -2.10
6R
Constant -1.54 2.05 0.46 -5.63  2.55
female Female -1.90 0.66 0.01 -3.21 -0.59
Asian Asian heritage  3.75 0.69 0.00  2.39  5.12
Hispanic Hispanic heritage -0.55 0.58 0.35 -1.70  0.61
Citizen US citizen  2.11 2.02 0.30 -1.91  6.13
Age Years in age over 17  0.67 0.22 0.00  0.23  1.12
Business Business  3.19 1.32 0.02  0.56  5.82
Graduate Graduate Student -4.48 1.38 0.00 -7.22 -1.74
GPAlow GPA score lower than 3.24 -5.78 1.49 0.00 -8.74 -2.82
6R
Constant -20.68 8.60 0.02 -37.81 -3.56
female Female -2.87 1.20 0.02 -5.27 -0.48
Asian Asian heritage 10.15 3.16 0.00 3.85 16.45
Hispanic Hispanic heritage -1.75 1.11 0.12 -3.96  0.46
Citizen US citizen 20.98 8.60 0.02  3.85 38.11
Age Years in age over 17  2.23 1.03 0.03  0.17  4.28
Business Business -2.38 1.41 0.10 -5.19  0.42
Graduate Graduate Student -3.84 1.79 0.04 -7.40 -0.28
GPAlow GPA score lower than 3.24 -2.63 0.95 0.01 -4.53 -0.73
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Figure 20: Recovering Subjective Beliefs
A. Risk Averse Agent
B. Risk Loving Agent
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Figure 21: The Extent of the Salvage Operation
Risk averse agent with true belief ¾
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Figure 22: The Difficulty of the Salvage Operation
A. Agent observed to pick A for all house probabilities 
0.1, 0.2, 0.3, 0.4, 0.5, 0.6, 0.7. 0.8 and 0.9
B. Agent observed to pick A for house probabilities 
0.1, 0.2, 0.3, 0.4, 0.5, 0.6, 0.7 and 0.8, and to pick B for house probability 0.9
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Appendix A: A Formal Model and Additional Results on Prediction Markets
We provide formal derivations of compensated demands for state contingent commodities,
xc(s), for some common  utility functions. In each case we represent beliefs about state s 0 S by
vectors b(s)>0, 3S b(s)=1 and market prices (reports) by vectors p(s)>0, 3S p(s)=1. A unit of
s-contingent wealth pays $1 if state s occurs and $0 otherwise, for all states s=1,2....n. We also define š
0 S, to aid the statement of summation operations. We then use these results to generate simulation
results on the extent to which prediction markets recover aggregate beliefs.
A. Formal Results
The table below shows four common utility functions (CRRA, CARA, logarithmic and Quasi-
Linear), their corresponding compensated demand functions, and the scoring rules they are associated
with. These scoring rules, or positive affine transformations of them, are defined in Jose, Nau, and
Winkler [2007] and Lad [1996].
Utility function Compensated demand function Scoring rule
u(x) = x(1-r)/(1-r) CE ×{[b(s)/(p(s)] / [ 3š [b(š)/x(š)]1-r/r ]1/1-r }1/r Pseudo-spherical
u(x) = - exp{-x/0} CE + 0 × ln[(b(s))/p(s)] Logarithmic
u(x) = ln(x) CE ×{[b(s)/(p(s)] / [ Jš [b(š)/x(š)]b(š)} Reciprocal
u(c,x) = c+x(1-r)/(1-r) EU + {[b(s)/(p(s)]1/r - 3š b(š)[b(š)/x(š)](1-r)/r}/(1-r) Power
If w(s) describes the aggregate wealth available, then the scoring rule in each case pays the
elicitee w(s)-xc(s)for a coherent probability report p(s). A report p(s) functions as a supporting price
p(s) for the compensated demands, selecting contingent commodities along the opportunity set
presented by the corresponding indifference curve, subject to staying within the bounds of the
available aggregate wealth, w(s) in each state.
CRRA Utility and the Pseudo-Spherical Scoring Rule
A risk averse CRRA agent is assumed to hold beliefs b(s) about a finite list of n states s0S,
such that b(s)>0, 3S b(s)=1. The EU for this agent is of the form
EU = [ 3S b(s) x(s)(1-r) ]/(1-r) (A1)
The corresponding certainty equivalent (CE) wealth is a weighted mean wealth of order 1-r: 
CE = [ 3S b(s) x(s)(1-r)/r ]1/(1-r) (A2)
This expression  for the CRRA agent’s CE is in standard CES form, where the elasticity of
substitution 0 =1/r is the reciprocal of the Arrow-Pratt relative risk aversion parameter r, and is a
measure of risk tolerance.
Consider the CRRA agent’s optimal choice problem as an expenditure minimization problem:
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minimize m=3S p(s)x(s) subject to a certainty equivalent constraint
CE1-r = 3S b(s) x(s)(1-r) (A3)
The first-order conditions are, for an appropriate Lagrange multiplier 8,
p(s) = 8(1-r) b(s) (x(s)-r) (A4)
We may identify 8 by using (A4) with the constraint (A3), from the following expression:
CEr = 8(1-r) { 3š b(š) [b(š)/p(š)]1-r/r }r/1-r (A5)
Substituting (A5) back into (A4) yields Hicksian compensated demand functions xc(s) for wealth in
state s:
xc(s) = CE ×{[b(s)/(p(s)] / [ 3š [b(š)/x(š)]1-r/r ]1/1-r }1/r (A6)
The denominator of (A6) is a risk-attitude-adjusted expected rate of return, a power mean of order (1-
r)/r of individual contingent asset expected rates of return b(s)/p(s) for this CRRA agent.
As noted in the text, the quadratic scoring rule is a special case of this form in which there are
only two states, so s={1,2}, b(s)=½ œs, CE=¼, r=½, T(s)=1 œs, and the subject’s reports are the
market prices p(s). In this case b(s) is interpreted as a parameter, and not as true beliefs.
CARA Utility and the Logarithmic Scoring Rule
A CARA EU function, based on an increasing, concave utility of wealth function  u(x) = -
exp{-x/0}, for 0>0 and beliefs b(s), has form: 
EU = - 3S b(s) exp{-x(s)/0} (A7)
The corresponding CE is  
CE=-0 ln(-EU) (A8)
From the first  order conditions for expenditure minimization subject to an EU constraint we have: 
p(s) = (8/0) b(s) exp{-x(s)/0} (A9)
for an appropriate Lagrange multiplier 8. Solving for xc(s) by taking logs and re-arranging:
xc(s) = 0 ln(8/0) + 0 ln[b(s)/p(s)] (A10)
To eliminate 8, sum (A9) over all s, use the constraint (A7) and the definition of CE in (A8), to obtain:
xc(s)=CE + 0 × ln[(b(s))/p(s)] (A11)
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Logarithmic Utility and the Reciprocal Scoring Rule
A Logarithmic EU function, based on an increasing, concave utility of  wealth function 
u(x)=ln(x), has form: 
EU = 3S b(s)  ln(x(s)) (A12)
The corresponding CE is defined by
EU = ln(CE) (A13)
From the first  order conditions for expenditure minimization subject to an EU constraint we have: 
 p(s) = 8 b(s) (1/x(s)) (A14)
for an appropriate Lagrange multiplier 8. Solving for xc(s) we obtain
xc(s) = 8 [b(s)/p(s)] (A15)
To eliminate 8, take the log of both sides of (A15) and substitute back into the constraint (A12) :
ln(CE) = ln(8) + 3S b(s) ln[(b(s))/p(s)] (A16)
Exponentiating both sides to eliminate 8, and substituting back into (A15):
xc(s) = CE ×{[b(s)/(p(s)] / [ Jš [b(š)/x(š)]b(š)} (A17)
Quasi-Linear Utility and the Power Scoring Rule
Consider a quasi-linear utility function u(c, x) = c + x(1-r)/1-r in two commodities, corn c and
wealth x. Assuming corn consumption is non-contingent, so that c(s) = c œ s, the expected utility
function is
EU = c + (1/r)  3S b(s) x(s)(1-r) (A18)
For convenience let the price of corn be $1 for sure, so that the budget constraint can be written
m=c+3S p(s)x(s). Then the expenditure minimization problem is to minimize m subject to an EU
constraint in the form of (A18). The first order conditions are, for an appropriate Lagrangian
multiplier 8, that 8=1 (derivative of the Lagrangian w.r.t. c) and that p(s) = 8 b(s) x(s)-r (derivatives of
the Lagrangian w.r.t. each x(s)), which simplifies rather easily to
p(s) = b(s) x(s)-r (A19)
Solving for the optimal compensated demands xc(s) and cc, we have
xc(s) = 3s [b(s)/p(s)]1/r (A20)
cc = EU + (1/r) 3s b(s)[b(s)/p(s)](1-r)/r (A21)
28 A separate issue is the ability of prediction markets to reliably elicit beliefs in “informationally
complex” environments: see Healy, Ledyard, Linardi and Lowery [2007]. As the state-space of events grows,
markets defined over each possible event-combination would be expected to become thin, resulting in
unreliable information aggregation.
29 In private correspondence Gjerstad shows that symmetric, bi-modal beliefs will also lead to near-
perfect aggregate belief elicitation in his model.
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From the quasi-linearity of utility we have u(c, x(s)) = u(c+x(s), 0). Let n denote the number of
possible states. Hence as prices p(s) vary and EU from (A18) remains constant, an indifference curve
(cc, xc(1), ÿ, xc(n)) traced out in n+1 dimensions also traces out an EU indifference curve in n-
dimensional contingent commodity space (cc+xc(1)/(1-r), ÿ, cc+xc(n)/(1-r)) according to the following
compensated demand functions yc(s), where yc(s) = cc + xc(s)/(1-r) is the money-metric, equivalent
contingent wealth for this agent. Substituting in (A20) and (A21) we obtain
yc(s) = EU + {[b(s)/(p(s)]1/r - 3š b(š)[b(š)/x(š)](1-r)/r}/(1-r) (A23)
 This has the form of a generalized power scoring rule.
B. Prediction Markets
Experimental economists were the first to develop prediction markets, originally defined over
presidential elections in the United States: see Forsythe, Nelson, Neumann and Wright [1992]. There
has been some controversy over the claim that these markets elicit “aggregate beliefs,” normally
understood to mean the average of beliefs for the population. There is no debate over whether these
markets generate good predictions.28 Instead the debate has been over the additional claim that the
prices in these markets recover the mean of aggregate beliefs. Our formal derivations can be used to
explore this controversy, beyond the analytical result presented in §2A.
Manski [2006] presented a simple, formal model in which a theoretical market did not elicit
average beliefs. He built in asymmetry on the buying and selling side of the market in terms of point-
mass beliefs, and assumed risk neutral agents with the same wealth (or finite bet constraint, which
amounts to the same thing in terms of the effect on market behavior).
Gjerstad [2005] and Wolfers and Zitzewitz [2005] present models in which they relax the
assumption of risk neutrality, and assume uni-modal beliefs, and find that markets can generate prices
that reflect average beliefs.29 However, their models build in homogeneity on both sides of the market,
which is the key criticism of Manski [2006]. Every agent is risk averse, but has the same attitude to
risk. And every agent has the same wealth level, or faces the same maximal bet constraint. So each
agent chooses to bet the same amount, on both sides of the market, and one recovers a homogenous
bidder model. One common feature of their models is that the log utility specification emerges as the
“poster boy” of aggregate belief elicitation: deviations from log utility are associated with deviations
from belief elicitation, although they each argue that these deviations are small for a wide range of
belief distributions.
Consider the log utility model initially. Assume 1,000 simulated agents with beliefs distributed
according to some parametric form. Initially we focus on a unimodal Normal distribution with mean
0.30 and standard deviation 0.10, and truncate at 0 the very few random draws that are negative. Let
30 Specifically, the have 100 units of wealth more than the baseline, and their discount rates are cut in
half.
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wealth be distributed uniformly between 1 and 100. Initially we assume that there is no discounting,
even though a key feature of prediction markets is that one places bets today for payoff in the future.
We also allow for free range betting, so that agents can rationally decide if they want to place a bet or
not; in the absence of discounting they always want to place a bet, but when discounting enters they
may not. 
Given their preferences, wealth, and beliefs, each agent evaluates their ordinary demand and
decides on an optimal bet on the event or its complement. We undertake this evaluation for each
agent, and then select the equilibrium price as the (unique) price at which demand equals supply. We
evaluate all prices between 0.001 and 0.999 in increments of 0.001. Figure A1 shows the happy result
that in this homogenous world prediction markets predict well and indeed recover the mean of
aggregate beliefs perfectly.
Figure A2 relaxes some of these assumptions. The top left panel is a baseline, that repeats the
assumptions from Figure A1 for reference. The top right panel allows for discounting behavior, and
free-range betting. Thus agents can determine if the present value of the certainty-equivalent of their
optimal bet is less than their current wealth, which is non-stochastic, and decide not to participate in
the market. We select discount rates uniformly between 1% and 25%. Again we find that prediction
markets do just fine.
But then we introduce some bias, in the bottom left panel of Figure A2, in favor of the
“optimistic” side of the market. We define the optimistic side as those agents that have beliefs which
are greater than the average belief. In this case we allow them to have greater wealth, and to be more
patient, than the baseline assumptions for them.30 These assumptions move the equilibrium price in
favor of their beliefs, and away from the average of beliefs. The bottom right panel combines
discounting and bias, for the same qualitative result. The difference between equilibrium price and
average belief is not quantitatively large, but it is clear.
Figure A3 repeats this exercise, but substituting CRRA utility for the log utility specification.
We draw CRRA values from a uniform distribution defined over the open interval (0, 1), to
correspond to modest amounts of risk aversion; log utility, of course, is the special case of CRRA
when the CRRA parameter tends to 1, and risk neutrality is the case of the CRRA parameter being 0.
The results are virtually the same as for log utility in Figure A2, but the inaccuracy of the equilibrium
price is increasing compared to the log utility case.
Figure A4 repeats the simulation from Figure A2, using log utility, but with an asymmetric, bi-
modal distribution generated as a linear average of two normal distributions. We now see even larger
differences between the equilibrium price and the average belief. Figure A5 then considers a
completely diffuse distribution of beliefs, generated uniformly between 0.01 and 0.99, and shows a
similarly difference between equilibrium price and average belief.
Taking all these results together, and in conjunction with those of the earlier literature, we
conclude that prediction markets can be expected to do a good job recovering the average of aggregate
beliefs under certain circumstances: unimodal distributions of beliefs, with no a priori reason to expect
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heterogeneity on either side of the market. Indeed, this environment might characterize many
interesting settings, such as political elections or closed prediction markets in which there is minimal
sample selection into the market (on the basis of beliefs, preferences and endowments). But the result
is not general, and it is easy to construct examples in which prediction markets do a predictably poor
job of recovering average beliefs.
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Figure A3: Prediction Markets with CRRA Utility
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Appendix B: Experimental Instructions
A. Binary Lottery Choice Task
YOUR INSTRUCTIONS
This is an experiment about choosing between lotteries with varying prizes and
chances of winning. You will be presented with a series of lotteries where you will make
choices between pairs of them. There are 60 pairs in the series. For each pair of lotteries,
you should indicate which of the two lotteries you prefer to play. You will actually get the
chance to play three of the lotteries you choose, and will be paid according to the outcome
of those lotteries, so you should think carefully about which lotteries you prefer.
You will be given $24 before you make a choice. Any losses will be deducted from
that $24. You cannot lose more than $24, no matter what choice you make in this
experiment.
Here is an example of what the computer display of such a pair of lotteries will look
like.  The display on your screen will be bigger and easier to read.
-B2-
The outcome of the lotteries will be determined by the draw of a random number
between 1 and 100. Each number between (and including) 1 and 100 is equally likely to
occur. In fact, you will be able to draw the number yourself using a special die that has all
the numbers 1 through 100 on it.
In the above example the left lottery pays minus eight dollars (-$8) if the random
number on the ball drawn is between 1 and 38, and pays minus three dollars (-$3) if the
number is between 39 and 100. The yellow color in the pie chart corresponds to 62% of
the area and illustrates the chances that the ball drawn will be between 39 and 100 and
your payoff will be -$3. The white area in the pie chart corresponds to 38% of the area and
illustrates the chances that the ball drawn will be between 1 and 38 and your payoff will be
-$8.
We have selected colors for the pie charts such that a lighter color indicates a lower
prize. White will be used when the prize is minus eight dollars (-$8).
Now look at the pie in the chart on the right. It pays minus eight dollars (-$10) if the
number drawn is between 1 and 75, and eight dollars ($8) if the number is between 76 and
100. As with the lottery on the left, the pie slices represent the fraction of the possible
numbers which yield each payoff. For example, the size of the -$8 pie slice is 75% of the
total pie.
Each pair of lotteries is shown on a separate screen on the computer. On each
screen, you should indicate which of the lotteries you prefer to play by clicking on one of
the three boxes beneath the lotteries. You should click the LEFT box if you prefer the
lottery on the left, the RIGHT box if you prefer the lottery on the right, and the DON’T
CARE box if you do not prefer one or the other.
You should approach each pair of lotteries as if it is one of the three that you will
play out. If you chose DON’T CARE in the lottery pair that we play out, you will pick one
using a standard six sided die, where the numbers 1-3 correspond to the left lottery and
the numbers 4-6 to the right lottery.
After you have worked through all of the pairs of lotteries, raise your hand and an
experimenter will come over. You will then roll a 20 sided die three times to determine
which pairs of lotteries that will be played out. One lottery pair from the first 20 pairs will be
selected, one from the next 20 pairs, and finally one from the last 20 pairs. If you picked
DON’T CARE for one of those pairs, you will use the six sided die to decide which one you
will play. Finally, you will roll the 100 sided die to determine the outcome of the lottery you
chose.
For instance, suppose you picked the lottery on the left in the above example. If the
random number was 37, you would lose $8; if it was 93, you would lose $3. If you picked
the lottery on the right and drew the number 37, you would lose $8; if it was 93, you would
gain $8.
Therefore, your payoff is determined by three things:
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• by which three lottery pairs that are chosen to be played out in the series of 60 such
pairs using the 20 sided die;
• by which lottery you selected, the left or the right, for each of these three pairs; and
• by the outcome of that lottery when you roll the 100 sided die.
This is not a test of whether you can pick the best lottery in each pair, because
none of the lotteries are necessarily better than the others. Which lotteries you prefer is a
matter of personal taste. The people next to you will have difference lotteries, and may
have different tastes, so their responses should not matter to you. Please work silently,
and make your choices by thinking carefully about each lottery.
All payoffs are in cash, and are in addition to the $5 show-up fee that you receive
just for being here. In addition to these earnings you will also receive a randomly
determined amount of money before we start. This can be any amount between $1 and
$10 and will be determined by rolling the 10 sided die. You will also receive $24 to cover
any losses.
When you have finished reading these instructions, please raise your hand. We will
then come to you, answer any questions you may have, let you roll the 10 sided die for the
additional money, and start you on a short series of practice choices. The practice series
will not be for payment, and consists of only 6 lottery pairs. After you complete the practice
we will start you on the actual series for which you will be paid.
As soon as you have finished the actual series, and after you have rolled the
necessary dice, you will be paid in cash and are free to leave.
Practice Session
In this practice session you will be asked to make 6 choices, just like the ones that
you will be asked to make after the practice. You may take as long as you like to make
your choice on each lottery.
You will not be paid your earnings from the practice session, or incur any losses, so
feel free to use this practice to become familiar with the task. When you have finished the
practice you should raise your hand so that we can start you on the tasks for which you
will be paid.
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B. Belief Elicitation Task
YOUR INSTRUCTIONS
This is an experiment that allows you to place bets on the outcome of events that
will happen in the future. For example, who will be the next U.S. President? Or who will
win the next U.S. Masters Golf Championship? Or will interest rates in the United States
go up? You can make more money if you have better estimates about these outcomes.
Our bets today will be similar to those that you can find in any number of betting
houses around the world. So we begin by showing you how some of these houses offer
their bets. William Hill is one of the world’s largest betting houses, and is based in the
United Kingdom. They offer legal off-course betting on a wide range of events, illustrated
on their web site at http://www.willhill.com. For example, here are the odds that they had
on May 23, 2006, for the first question posed above: who will be the next U.S. President?
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You see that the odds that they quote imply that Hilary Clinton is the favorite,
followed by John McCain and then John Edwards. Clinton is listed as having a price of
3.00. This means that for every $1 that you bet on Clinton winning, you will get back $3 if
she does win – but you lose your $1 if she does not win. If you think that Clinton is virtually
certain to win, this is a good bet for you to take on. But if you think that Clinton has no
hope of winning, you would not take this bet.
The odds quoted here suggest that it is less likely that McCain or Edwards will win.
If McCain wins you would get $6 for every $1 bet, compared to $3 if you bet on Clinton
and she won. Similarly, if Condaleeza Rice wins you would get $15 for every $1 bet.
You can also see on the left hand side that they offer bets in a wide range of sports,
including blockbuster events such as Hurling and Darts! They even have some special
events in the entertainment field. Here are the odds that Taylor Hicks and Katherine
McPhee will win the American Idol competition on TV:
So Hicks was the favorite a few hours before the show aired. If you bet $10 on Hicks and
he won you would earn $14.00 in winnings. If you bet $10 on McPhee and she won you
would earn $27.50. Of course, this final is now over and you probably know that Hicks
won, but these were the odds being offered before the show aired. Do you believe that
these were good odds to bet on or not? That is what our experiment asks you to decide for
several events yet to occur.
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Another popular betting site is CentreBet, at http://sports.centrebet.com/. This is a
large betting house based in Australia. Here you can bet on a similar range of sporting
events from around the world, as well as some local Australian sports. For example, the
screen shot below shows their odds for the round #9 match between Hawthorn and
Sydney in the Australian Football League. The odds are $3.50 for Hawthorn to win and
$1.30 for Sydney to win, each on a wager of $1. The orange box on the right shows the
bet and payout for each outcome.
One last example is the New Zealand TAB (Totalisater Agency Board), which is in
New Zealand of course. Their betting web sit is at http://www.tab.co.nz/.  They are offering
the following odds on a soccer match between the United States and Morocco, a warm-up
for the World Cup later this year:
So these odds suggest that the NZ TAB believes that the US is more likely to win than
Morocco is, and that a draw is more likely than Morocco winning. 
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As you can see, there are many betting houses around the world. Each one offers
odds on a wide range of outcomes, including local events and events in other countries. It
is common to see some differences in the odds quoted by different betting houses. 
To illustrate, consider bets on which U.S. NBA basketball team is going to win the
NBA Championship for 2006. This event attracts odds-makers from many betting houses.
The web site http://www.oddschecker.com/ lists odds for the same event from most of the
big online betting houses. Here are the odds being quoted for the top 3 teams. The teams
are listed in each row, and each betting house is listed in each column.
We see that there are differences in the odds quoted by different betting houses.
For comparability, these odds are all taken for the same day and time: May 24 at 5pm.
They are also taken for the same level of wager, shown here as £100 (about $187), since
the odds can vary with the size of the bet. The odds for the Dallas Mavericks range from
$2.49 up to $3.04 for every $1 wagered. The odds for the Detroit Pistons range from $1.98
up to $2.88 for every $1 wagered. And the odds for the Miami Heat range from $3.50 up to
$5.20 for every $1 wagered.
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Lets go through an example of the betting tasks we will ask you to do. These are
patterned after the display shown above for the NZ TAB. All of the screen shots below
were taken from the betting screens you will use. The choices were ones we made just to
illustrate. Your computer will provide better screen shots that are easier to read.
Our betting tasks will differ in several ways:
• First, we will provide you with odds from several betting houses. There may just be
one betting house, or there may be several. Think of these as just alternative places
you can place your bet. You need to decide what to bet for each betting house.
• Second, you will have a stake of $10 to bet with for each betting house. In some
cases you will have to use the whole $10 to place a bet. In other cases you can
decide what fraction of the $10 to bet, or bet none of it. The computer will tell you
which case applies to you today. You cannot use your stake in one betting house
and apply it to a bet in another betting house.
• Third, if there are several betting houses offering you odds, we will pick one of
them to actually pay you. You will be asked to “place your bets,” or “not bet,” for
each house. Then we will pause and come over and you can roll a die to decide
which betting house we will actually use.
• Finally, all payments will be made on a date specified on the betting screen. Some
events are over in a few weeks, and some are over in a few months. You will then
be paid all earnings, including any money you decide not to bet (if you have that
choice).
Here is the opening page, telling you the setup for your choices. This setup will
apply to all of your choices today. The information on your screen may differ from this
display, so be sure to read it before
making any choices. 
In this case you are told that
you will be quoted odds from 9 betting
houses. You have a $10 stake for
each betting house, and you can
decide how much to bet for each
house. Click on Begin, in the bottom
of the screen (not shown below) to
start...
To illustrate we will use the
USA versus Morocco soccer match as an example. The event that you will be asked to bet
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on will be whether the USA wins or not. Note that you are betting either that the USA wins
or that the USA does not win. Thus, if there is a draw, that is the same as the USA not
winning. This screen provides you with the betting form you will use...
On this screen you will first see the event listed in the top left hand corner. We also
list the bet, in this case that the USA wins. In the top right hand corner you see when the
event is to occur, and when we would pay out any earnings. We will obtain an address
and/or e-mail contact for you at the end of the experiment, so that we can send you a
check for your earnings. Of course, you will receive all other earnings from today’s session
in cash, paid out at the end of the session.
You will next see the stake amounts you can bet at each of the 9 betting houses.
You choose how much to bet, or if you prefer not to bet at all. Then you choose whether
you want to bet on USA winning or on USA not winning.
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You will see that each betting house offers different odds. The first betting house,
for example, pays $10 for every $1 that you bet on the USA winning, if in fact the USA
wins, or $1.11 for every $1 that you bet on the USA not winning.
Beside each set of odds, we also display the probability that each event will occur.
This is just another way of thinking about the odds. Some people understand odds better,
and some people understand probabilities better. The probabilities are just the inverse of
the odds. So if the odds say that you will be paid $5 for every $1 bet if the USA wins, as in
betting house 2, then this implies a probability for the USA winning of $1 ÷ $5 = 0.2. This is
the same things as there being a 20% chance of the USA winning. We have rounded
some of the probabilities to make the screen easier to read, and you will be paid according
to the odds.
Here is an example of how you place a bet, using
betting house 1. In this case we chose to bet all of the $10
stake, and we bet that the USA would win. The betting
screen then tells us what our net winnings would be if either
outcome occurs. If the USA wins we get $10 for every $1 we
bet, and we bet $10, so we earn $100. But that cost us our
$10 bet, so the net winnings in this case are $90. But if the
USA does not win, we lose our $10 bet.
In this case we would place this bet if we were
confident that the USA has a better chance of winning than
the 10% implied by the odds that this betting house is
quoting. If we thought that the USA had less than a 10%
chance of winning, we could (a) bet $10 that the USA does
not win, (b) bet nothing, or (c) bet something between $1 and
$10 that the USA does not win.
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In the screen below we have filled in bets for every one of the 9 betting houses, to
illustrate how you fill in the complete sheet. You do not have to place the same bet for
every betting house, or bet the same amount:
If we wanted to bet less than $10 for any
betting house, we simply click on the amount we
want to bet. The display changes to show the
change in net winnings. In this case we bet $5 with
one betting house, $0 with another, $3 with
another, and $10 with the remaining houses.
-B12-
When you have entered all of your
bets, and you are happy with your choices,
you click on the green SUBMIT BETS tab,
and you will be asked to signal the
experimenter to come over. We will then roll
a die to determine which betting house you
will actually place your bet with. 
After you click OK, a special box will come up which the experimenter uses to
unlock the screen with a super-secret
password. Please do not type anything
here. The experimenter will do that when he
or she comes over.
The experimenter will then have you
roll a die to determine the betting house you
will place your bet with. The experimenter
will enter this, and then another password.
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In this case we selected betting house 8, so the screen displays that bet. This
information will then be recorded on your payment sheet.
You will be asked to place bets on several events. When you finish one event you
will be given a new betting sheet for the other event. In a moment we will provide you with
a sheet listing the events that you will be asked to place bets on.
Remember that we will pay you all earnings from these bets on the dates specified.
We will also then pay you any money that you choose not to wager, if you have that
option.
At the very end we will have a series of questions about you. Your responses will be
confidential, and will not be connected with your name or any other identifying ID such as
a SSN.
There are no right or wrong choices.  Which choices you make depends on your
personal preferences and your beliefs about what the chances are that each event will
actually occur. The people next to you will have different tasks, and may have different
preferences or beliefs, so their responses should not matter to you. Nor do their choices
affect your earnings in any way. Please work silently, and make your choices by thinking
carefully about the odds being offered in relation to how likely you believe each outcome
is.
Do you have any questions?
31 Two additional concerns are also sometimes expressed: (a) that there may be a large fraction of
inconsistent decisions where subjects switch back and forth between A and B, implying a violation of
monotonicity of preference, and (b) that it only elicits “interval responses,” and therefore is not as accurate as
open-ended procedures that elicit “point responses.” These concerns are addressed in Harrison, Lau,
Rutström and Sullivan [2005] and Andersen et al. [2006].
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Appendix C: Extensions
Our application illustrates all of the steps in the belief elicitation procedure we propose. But
we realize that there are many possible extensions. Some are procedural, in the sense that they test
features of the experimental design that might have influenced behavior; some are conceptual, in the
sense that they reflect insights from our general theoretical framework; and some are statistical, in the
sense that they modify some of the steps undertaken in the econometric recovery of latent subjective
beliefs.
A. Procedural Extensions
Framing
The belief elicitation task is another variant on the “multiple price list” formats used in the
elicitation of many other subjective values (e.g., risk attitudes, discount rates, valuations). It is subject
to one major behavioral concern, the effect that the frame of the task has on responses.31 It is possible
that subjects will be drawn to respond on the middle of the frame, inferring that the experimenter has
picked the end-points on the basis of some extra information that will help them make a better choice.
This inference is false, but can nonetheless be a behavioral anchor, even though probabilities do have
a natural frame between 0 and 1 as a matter of definition.
One solution is to frame the task differently to subjects, and determine if it systematically
affects their responses. There is some evidence that there are such anchoring effects, but that they are
not large in relation to the uncertainty over individual responses, and can be measured and hence
controlled for (Andersen et al. [2006]). For example, for roughly half of our subjects one would use a
frame that spans probabilities of each event from 0.1 up to 0.9 in increments of 0.1, and for the other
half use a frame that spans probabilities of 0.1 up to 0.5 in increments of 0.05. If there is an anchoring
effect biasing responses to the mid-point of the frame we would expect to see lower elicited
probabilities in the “narrow” frame compared to the “wide frame.”
Another solution might be to operationalize the manner in which the house odds are chosen
for each subject, to make it clear that there is no experimenter role. One could mark 20 bingo balls
with odds reflecting 0.05 increments in probability between 0.05 and 0.95, put them in a bingo cage
that is vigorously shuffled, then have 9 selected without replacement. The risk is that one might draw
several odds that are close to each other, and leave some large gaps, but over a larger sample of
subjects this lumpiness would not be a major problem.
Cognitive Burden
Another direct extension to our elicitation procedure would be to provide feedback to subjects
on the expected income implications of each possible bet, and the manner in which their subjective
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beliefs affect expected income. We could use the computerized interface to show the subject the
implications of rational bets conditional on a stated subjective belief. The subject would move his
beliefs, denominated in terms of the probability of one event, on a slider, and the betting form
interface changes the expected income implied. This would significantly reduce the computational
burden of these calculations, if one relaxes the “as if” assumption and assumes for the moment that
subjects evaluate options the way we model them. It might also anchor behavior towards the risk
neutral bet, since there is some evidence that providing information on expected income of lotteries
reduces elicited risk aversion; on the other hand, such shifts might just reflect true risk attitudes
without the confound of the cognitive burden of calculating EV (Harrison and Rutström [2008; §2.7]).
One potentially important treatment would
be to initiate the information display at the optimal
response for a risk-neutral bettor with a stated
subject probability belief. In this version the subject
would be initially asked to provide a belief that
event A would occur.  This is accomplished by
providing a slider, illustrated here, that the subject
could move between 0% and 100%. A numerical
display would then identify the exact percentages
implied.
Once the subject had entered this
information, and confirmed it, a betting sheet
comes up as shown on the next page. This sheet is
the same as the one displayed in our experiments,
except that the bets are already initialized and there is a
display at the bottom of the expected bet winnings and total
expected earnings. These expectations reflect the belief that the subject had entered immediately prior,
which is a 20% chance of Brazil winning. Consider the first bet, in which the subject wins $90 if Brazil
wins and loses the $10 wager if Brazil does not win. The expected winnings are then $18 (= $90 × 0.2)
minus $8 (= -$10 × 0.8), or $10 as shown.
If the subject had entered a different belief, the initial bets and numeric display of expected
winnings would have changed. The subject can change any bet, and the interface shows the effect on
total expected earnings. For example, if the subject chooses to bet for Brazil with the 9th betting house,
which is offering such extreme odds that Brazil will lose, then total expected earnings drop from
$147.43 to $69.63, as shown in the extract at the bottom of the next page. If this subject had stated a
belief that Brazil would win that was 90% or greater, this might be an optimal bet for a risk-neutral
agent to make, but not with the stated 20% belief that Brazil would win.
We stress, and this is explained carefully to the subject, that these initial bets are optimal only if the
subject is neutral with respect to risk. We actually explain in the instructions that if the subject is extremely
averse to any risks, the best thing they could do is to not bet at all and just collect $10 at some future
date. Or, if the subject is forced to bet, to bet as if they thought that Brazil would win with a 50%
chance. We also point out that if they are not so risk averse, doing either of these things would reduce
their expected earnings.
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32 The econometric analysis would be slightly modified to allow for the fact that subjects have at least
3 choices now, even if we ignore the variation in stake: bet all on A, bet all on B, do not bet on either. So one
cannot use the binary choice model, but would have to move to well-known generalizations (e.g., Train [2003;
ch.2, 3]).
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B. Conceptual Extensions
Free Range Betting
We have already indicated throughout that an important extension would be to allow subjects
to pick which bookies to place bets on, and to vary the stake that they apply to any bet. This extension
is not necessary in the laboratory environment, where we can gloss the “participation constraint” and
provide subjects with play money to make bets with. But it provides an important bridge to help us
understand the behavior of prediction markets that are open to the public. Our experimental
instructions, in Appendix B, illustrate how we explain this free range option to subjects, since we
designed them to be general.32
Free range betting opens up two additional issues. One is to allow subjects not to bet, but to
restrict them to bets of $0 or $10 (or whatever the finite stake is). The ability to select intermediate
stakes allows a constructive response to the issues of field censoring in “interval elicitation methods”
raised by Cubitt and Read [2007]. The second issue is the effect on behavior of having subjects make
choices with stakes that they have earned by some non-trivial effort rather than been endowed with as
“play money.” There is striking evidence of differences in behavior in social preference settings, and
this could be a more general behavioral phenomenon (Rutström and Williams [2000] and Cherry,
Frykblom and Shogren [2002]).
Improving Incentives
We could modify the opportunity set for subjects in ways that enhance our ability to recover
their latent subject belief. We assumed that our subjects would tend to be risk averse, as explained in
§2.C and lamented in §4.C when we discovered that some subjects were in fact risk loving. This
assumption was, of course, well justified by the available evidence, but simply failed to reflect the
individual preferences of some subjects in our sample. One could, however, use the computerized
interface to provide subjects with an opportunity set constructed specifically for them. If they are shown to be
(weakly) risk averse in some initial lottery task, then use the opportunity set in our experiment.
Otherwise, if they are shown to be risk loving, modify the opportunity set as explained in §2.C.
Does one run the risk that subjects might strategically mis-represent their preferences in the
lottery task so as to generate a more attractive opportunity set in the belief elicitation task? This is a
theoretical possibility, but a practically remote one that could be mitigated by various experimental
procedures. Or one could predict the risk attitudes of the belief-elicitation subject from a separate
cohort of subjects that had participated in the risk attitude elicitation task.
Changing Places
A more fundamental extension is to change roles in the “trading game” between bookie and
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bettor, and have subjects take the part of the bookie rather than the bettor. Just as duality allows one
to attain the same optima by utility maximization or cost minimization, when we view the belief
elicitation task as an exchange game defined over state-contingent commodities, it is natural to see
how one can elicit subjective beliefs by having subjects play either role.
We adopted the frame in our experiment that had the subject take the role of the bettor, since
it was more natural for our subjects as consumers to be facing betting odds rather than setting them.
But we can envisage subject pools for whom the other role would be more natural. Managers of firms
who are deciding on product placement and pricing are in effect making book against the market
based on their subjective beliefs.
Uncertainty in Beliefs
We noted earlier that the belief we elicit is what a statistician calls a predictive distribution, and
that the elicited belief is consistent with a wide range of supporting beliefs about the underlying
probability. The reason for the latter inference is that there are two sources of uncertainty embedded
in a predictive distribution, and in general we cannot know from our design which source is more
important. One source is uncertainty in the estimates of parameters defining the probability of the
event, and the other source is uncertainty over the sample realization. For example, assume that the
event is to bet on the number of times a coin toss comes out Heads. If the sample to be used to
determine payoffs is 1, then there is some well-defined probability distribution that a fair coin would
come out heads. But if the sample is much larger, say 30, then that distribution has the same mean but
with a much smaller variance. Does that change in the predictive distribution affect behavior in belief
elicitation?
This question also raises deeper conceptual issues about the formal modeling of “second order
beliefs,” “ambiguity,” and “uncertainty” which we choose to side-step for now. Our objective is to
make a start with settled theory about decision making under subjective risk, as usually defined. We do
not believe that there is currently sufficient structure on these more general models to permit one to
recover subjective beliefs, although ongoing research may change that judgement.
C. Econometric Modeling Extensions
Alternative Models of Choice Behavior
It was a simple matter to “swap out” the EUT specification of choice under uncertainty and
replace it with the RDU specification. The extension to consider probability weighting is particularly
important in this setting, since we are after all eliciting probabilities. But the same logic would allow
one to extend the specification to include Cumulative Prospect Theory or any other preferred model
of choice under uncertainty. Although we stress that the observer has to take a stand with respect to
the model of choice under uncertainty that the subject is assumed to employ, our procedures
generalize easily to alternative specifications.
Parametric Assumptions
We concede that we rely heavily on parametric functional forms to illustrate the manner in
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which one recovers latent subjective beliefs. The functions we adopt are standard and reasonably
general, but we appreciate that there are alternatives worth exploring. Indeed, given the importance of
the probability weighting function, we illustrated one such extension ourselves.
A related issue is to consider non-parametric approaches. These come of two general varieties:
non-parametric specifications of the utility function or probability weighting function, as in Hey and
Orme [1994], and/or non-parametric specifications of the statistical specification linking the
deterministic choice model to observed behavior. We find these alternatives seductive, but they add
needless complexity to our illustration of the basic steps of recovering latent subjective beliefs from
observed betting choices.
Individual Heterogeneity
It is, in principle, a simple matter to estimate latent subjective beliefs at the level of the
individual, rather than pooling over individuals. Although we do account for a rich set of individual
characteristics in all core parameters, there might still be some unobserved individual heterogeneity
that can best be addressed by estimating at the level of the individual. In terms of models of decision
making under risk, Hey and Orme [1994] remains a classic in this regard. However, one faces
inevitable numerical issues with specific individual estimates, and that can become time-consuming to
evaluate and report efficiently. For our methodological purposes there is nothing new involved in
extending the analysis to the level of the individual, so we avoid it here. 
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Appendix D: Connections to the Literature
It is not appropriate to survey the literature on belief elicitation, not least because of the vast
scope of the task. Instead we restrict ourselves to the more important connections to building blocks
we rely on, and directly comparable approaches.
A. Theoretical Literature
The scoring rule derivations we provide in §2 and Appendix A have also been developed
independently by Jose, Nau and Winkler [2007]. However, their decision-theoretic approach to scoring
rules and belief elicitation problems is driven by a desire to generalize and unify the plethora of
measures of divergence between probability distributions and measures of the quantity of information
in statistics. The methods they use to achieve their objective perhaps obscures a fundamental insight
about belief elicitation in their analysis, familiar from the mechanism design literature in economics:  if
you know (or assume) specific details about the general form of preferences you can always find
incentive compatible elicitation mechanisms for beliefs via ordinary demand functions. 
Suppose A has an EU utility function of wealth f(x) with beliefs  b, {b(1).... b(n)}, and a
budget set in contingent commodity space described by 3s p(s)x(s)=m. Under standard regularity
conditions there will be a unique set of optimal wealth choices x*(s,b,p,m,f), one for each state s, that
will depend on A’s personal beliefs b. These are A’s ordinary demand functions for s-contingent
wealth in a competitive market. The choices  x*(s, bN, p, m, f) maximize somebody else’s utility in the
budget set 3s p(s)x(s)=m, a somebody perhaps just like A except that their beliefs are bN, and not b.
These choices are not EU-maximizing for A – by revealed preference, it cannot be any better, and is
probably worse. The s-contingent wealth functions x*(s, r, p, m, f), for varying reports r, can however
function as an incentive compatible scoring rule for A. That is, if A is faced with an opportunity set of
s-contingent wealth payments, x*(s, r, p, m, f) , all of which satisfy 3s p(s)x(s)=m, and A’s means of
implementing a wealth choice is to choose a vector of numbers r, plug them in to her ordinary
demand functions, and obtain the resulting wealth, then A would choose to report her beliefs r=b in
order to maximize her EU in this budget set. 
While these  ordinary demand functions, if we knew them, could function as an incentive
compatible scoring rule for A, call it an x-score, they would not typically be a “proper”scoring rule
(i.e., one maximizing A’s expected x-score of A’s contingent wealth along a linear budget line), because
A may not be risk neutral. With a mathematical slight of hand we can, however, turn the incentive
compatible scoring rules x*(s, r, p, m, f) for A into proper scoring rules. Imagine that A’s
score-payouts are no longer observable wealth levels x(s) lying along a linear wealth constraint in
s-contingent commodity space, but unobservable utility levels u(s)=f(x(s)) lying along a corresponding
non-linear constraint in s-contingent commodity space. (The constraint would be linear if f is linear).
If we try to maximize A’s expected u-score, 3s b(s)u(s), constrained to u(s)=f(x*(s, r, p, m, f)), by
choosing a “report” r, then r=b will maximize that expected u-score. Hence the u-score is a proper
(expected u-score maximizing) scoring rule.
This general characterization of incentive compatible scoring rules, and how to turn them into
proper scoring rules, is not trivial. It does reveal that there are as many different scoring rules as there
are different utility of wealth functions. Jose, Nau and Winkler [2007] takes this idea seriously, using
33 Hanson [1996] contains some important corrections to some of the claims about QSR elicitation in
McKelvey and Page [1990].
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f(x) as a power function, xa, and through an appropriate re-scaling of this utility function, (1/($-1){[1+
$x)($-1)-1}, derive ordinary demand functions which, when optimized against a linear budget constraint
and transformed using the mathematical sleight of hand noted above, yield generalized forms of many
well-knows scoring rules. 
Jose, Nau and Winkler [2007] contains excellent deductive logic: if preferences are given, they
show that we can find a proper scoring rule in utility units to elicit true beliefs. This is valuable, but
does not address the elicitation problem that we are concerned with: given an opportunity set
described in wealth space by a scoring rule, what will forecasters of differing risk attitudes choose to
report? 
B. Experimental Literature
Experimental economists have used several of the popular scoring rules, but with one notable
exception discussed in §C below, none have corrected for any deviation from risk neutrality.
The QSR was apparently first used by McKelvey and Page [1990], and later by Offerman,
Sonnemans and Schram [1996], McDaniel and Rutström [2001], Nyarko and Schotter [2002], Schotter
and Sopher [2003], Rutström and Wilcox [2006] and Costa-Gomes and Weizsäcker [2007].33 In each
case the subject is implicitly or explicitly assumed to be risk-neutral. Schotter and Sopher [2003; p.
504] recognize the role of risk aversion, but appear to argue that it is not a factor behaviorally:
It can easily be demonstrated that this reward function provides an incentive for
subjects to reveal their true beliefs about the actions of their opponents. Telling the
truth is optimal; however, this is true only if the subjects are risk neutral. Risk aversion
can lead subjects to make a “secure” prediction and place a .50 probability of each
strategy. We see no evidence of this type of behavior.
Of course, evidence of subjects selected the probability report of ½ only shows that the subject has
extreme risk aversion. The absence of that extreme evidence says nothing about the role that risk
aversion might play in general.
Scoring rules that are linear in the absolute deviation of the estimate have been used by
Dufwenberg and Gneezy [2000] and Haruvy, Lahav and Noussair [2007]. Croson [2000] and Hurley
and Shogren [2005] used scoring rules that are linear in the absolute deviation as well as providing a
bonus for an exactly correct prediction. It is well-known that linear scoring rules elicit the median of the
subjective predictive distribution for a risk-neutral agent, and of course this will also be the mean and
mode if the distribution is unimodal and symmetric.
Scoring rules that provide a positive reward for an “exact” prediction and zero otherwise have
been used by Charness and Dufwenberg [2006] and Dufwenberg, Gächter and Hennig-Schmidt
[2007]. In each case the inferential objective has been to test hypotheses drawn from “psychological
34 The need for some correction is also recognized by Offerman, Sonnemans and Schram [1996;
p.824, fn.8] and Rutström and Wilcox [2007; p.11, fn.8].
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game theory,” which rest entirely on making operational the beliefs of players in strategic games. In
the former study the “exact” prediction of a probability was defined as an estimate within 5 percentage
points of the true outcome; in the latter study the estimates were over 41 finite contribution levels in a
public good, so the prediction had to be the correct integer to receive the reward. It is easy to show
that this scoring rule elicits the mode for a risk-neutral agent. In the case of contributions to a public
good this is not at all likely to be a unimodal and symmetric distribution, given the expectation of a
significant spike at the zero contribution level implied by perfect free-riding (e.g., see the histograms
displayed in Dufwenberg, Gächter and Hennig-Schmidt [2007; Appendix B]). The rationale for this
scoring rule, rather than the QSR, is provided by Charness and Dufwenberg [2006; p.1586]: “Overall,
we chose our belief-elicitation protocol mainly because it is simple and rather easy to describe in
instructions. [...] Our idea is to get a rough-but-meaningful ballpark estimate of participants’ degrees of
belief.” We certainly accept that the QSR can be difficult to explain to subjects, but do not know what
the phrase “rough-but-meaningful ballpark estimate” means: either we take the incentives to report
beliefs seriously, or we do not.
Most experimental economists embed the elicitation of probabilities in another experimental
task that the subject is undertaking. Indeed, one of the hypotheses being studied is whether the effort
to elicit beliefs will encourage players in a game to think more strategically (Croson [2000], Rutström
and Wilcox [2006], Costa-Gomes and Weizsäcker [2007]). Of course, this violates the “no stakes
condition” required for the QSR to elicit beliefs reliably unless one assumes that the subject is risk
neutral. Only one study employs a “spectator” treatment in which players are asked to provide beliefs
but do not take part in the constituent game determining the event outcome: study #2 of Offerman,
Sonnemans and Schram [1996].
The most serious concern with the experimental implementations of scoring rules is that the
rewards are very, very small. For example, Nyarko and Schotter [2002] and Rutström and Wilcox
[2006] gave each subject an endowment of 10 cents, from which their penalties are to be deducted. So
the effect of the scoring rule is literally defined in terms of fractions of pennies, and the additional
rewards are not very substantial for optimal reports as compared to reports near the optimum.
Whatever position one takes on the issue of “flat payoff functions” raised by Von Winterfeldt and
Edwards [1986] and Harrison [1989], these rewards for accuracy are disappointing. 
We have discussed the development of prediction markets by experimental economists in
Appendix A. In addition, experimental economists have considered parimutuel betting markets as a
means of eliciting aggregate beliefs: see Hurley and McDonough [1995] and Plott, Wit and Yang
[2003]. 
C. Econometric Literature
Only one study attempts to recover elicited beliefs from observed choices, calibrating for non-
linear utility functions and/or probability weighting: Offerman, Sonnemans, van de Kuilen and
Wakker [2007; §6].34 They provide a statement of some alternative ways in which this recovery could
35 On the other hand, if one uses other elicitation procedures, such as the Trade-Off design of
Wakker and Deneffe [1996], Fennema and van Assen [1999], Abdellaoui [2000] and Abdellaoui, Bleichrodt
and Paraschiv [2007], then the procedures can indeed become laborious for the subject. There are other
reasons not to use these methods, the most significant of which is their lack of incentive compatibility as
conventionally applied (Harrison and Rutström [2008; §1.5]). But these methods are not needed, and the
stated concerns with this approach to recovering subjective beliefs are not substantial.
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be undertaken, essentially the method we use, and then propose a new method. Their method can be
viewed as an empirical “reduced form” approach to adjusting for risk attitudes. 
One method they consider is by estimating or eliciting the functional forms of a model of
choice under risk (e.g., EUT, RDU or CPT), then observing beliefs over a natural event in some task,
and econometrically recovering the implied subjective beliefs by using the estimated model of choice
under risk to “back out” the subjective probability that must have been used in the belief elicitation
task. They dismiss this approach, which is the one we follow. They claim, without further discussion,
that estimating or eliciting the functional forms is “laborious” and that it involves “complex multi-
parameter estimations.” It is certainly true that the joint likelihood involves several parameters, but
such estimation is standard fare with maximum likelihood modeling, so that is hardly a concern (unless
one wants to avoid writing out customized likelihoods). It is not clear in what sense this is a
“complex” undertaking. The labor involved depends on how one undertakes the estimation or
elicitation. In our case the subjects need to do one task, which consists of 60 binary choices over
lotteries, and then all of the labor involved is by the computer estimating maximum likelihood models
that have been well-studied for years (e.g., Harrison and Rutström [2008; §2] for a survey).35
The empirical method they use instead has an attractive reduced form simplicity. For a given
subject, it uses the QSR to elicit reported probabilities for naturally occurring events, and then uses the
QSR in a calibration task to elicit a “risk correction function” that allows them to recover the
subjective probability that generated the report for the naturally occurring event. The risk correction
function simply elicits reports for “objective probabilities,” such as the chance that a single roll of a
100-sided die will come up between 1 and 25. Assume the subject report 0.30 for this event. Then, if
the subject ever reported a 0.30 in the initial task for the naturally occurring event, they would infer
that he had a subjective probability of 0.25 underlying it, since that was the objective probability that
generated this report using the (same) scoring rule. Thus the difference between the report of 0.30 in
the calibration task and the true underlying probability is attributed solely to the effects of non-linear
utility and/or probability weighting. By eliciting a risk correction function for a wide range of
probabilities, and with a sufficiently fine grid, one can recover any report with some reasonable
accuracy.
This approach is attractive, and avoids the need for the researcher to “take a stand” on which
model of choice under uncertainty determines betting behavior. To see the key assumption underlying
their approach, let N be the actuarial  probability that the calibration event will occur. For some
artefactual events, such as tossing coins and rolling die, N is well defined, but for other events it is not
so well defined. Let B(N) be the function that summarizes the subjective belief that the subject actually
holds that the calibration event will occur, and let R(B(N)) be the function transforming B(N) into a
report using the QSR, or any appropriate scoring rule. Offerman et al. [2007] first assume that B(N) =
N in the calibration task, so that the only reason that R(B(N)) … N is that the subject has non-linear utility
36 So there is no allowance for subjects to make decision errors in the calibration task, or the
elicitation task for the naturally occurring event for that matter. These errors could be subsumed into some
sampling error on estimates of R(B(N)) as an empirical function of N, but then one is relying on the errors
being well-behaved statistically. In fact, Offerman et al. [2007; equation (8.3)] do allow for an additive error
term which they assume to be truncated normal to ensure that reported probabilities lie between 0 and 1.
Their pooled estimates indicate that there is a need for some correction for non-linear utility, but that it is not
so clear that probability weighting is an issue (the log-likelihood for row #1 in their Table 9.1, which allows
for both effects, is virtually identical to the log-likelihood for row #5, in which no probability weighting is
assumed). Although they allow for errors to vary with an incentives treatment applied between-subjects, it
would be useful to extend their statistical analysis of the pooled data to allow for correlated errors at the level
of the individual subject, rather than implicitly assume homoskedasticity.
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and/or undertakes probability weighting.36  Why might B(N) … N, for such simple tasks? Apart from
concerns with loaded die, or certain cultures imbuing randomizing devices or colors on chips with
some animist intent, we would be concerned with psychological editing processes based on similarity
relations. To take a simplistic example, someone might “round down” to the nearest increment of 0.05
or 0.10 and then decide how to report using this subjectively edited probability B(N) as the basis for
any adjustments due to non-linear utility or probability weighting. Is the actuarial probability N the one
we really want to compare R(B(N)) to in such a case, or is it B(N)?
This might seem to be nit-picking when it comes to the rolling of a 100-sided die in the
calibration task, and perhaps viewed as part of a latent structural psychological story underlying the
idea of probability weighting. But it is surely more significant for naturally occurring events. Here is
where the second assumption comes in: that B(N) = N in the belief elicitation task where N is defined (or
not) over naturally occurring events. Thus, what if we accept that B(N) = N is a reasonable assumption
for the calibration task with the artefactual event, but cannot be so sure for the task with the naturally
occurring event? Our position is that we are recovering B(N), “warts and all” in terms of how the
subject conceives of the event and defines the probability N. Offerman et al. [2007] would appear to
be recovering the “touched up” image of B(N), N, after the warts have been removed.
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